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ABSTRACT 
 
WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT 
Ünal, Beyza 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
July 2010 
 
This thesis examines the concept of winning hearts and minds from a historical 
analysis to a contemporary framework. The literature on the concept fell short of 
success to implement the practice of winning hearts and minds. The concept did not 
solely attribute to security studies but to religion and political science as well in 
history. Therefore, within a historical outlook, winning hearts and minds has a robust 
conceptualization. Moreover, this thesis attempts to formulate the components of the 
concept of winning hearts and minds. To analyze the components, two sets of case 
studies, Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency, and London attack and Madrid 
bombings are taken into consideration with regard to the success and failure of state 
policies.  
Keywords: Winning Hearts and Minds, Coercion, Persuasion, Insurgency, Terrorism 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
KALPLERİ VE AKILLARI KAZANMA: TARİHSEL İNCELEME VE  
KAVRAMIN ÇALIŞMA ŞEKLİ 
Ünal, Beyza 
M.A., Uluslararası İlişkiler Departmanı 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
Temmuz 2010 
 
 
Bu çalışma, kalpleri ve akılları kazanma kavramını tarihi açıdan ele alarak 
günümüzde terör ile mücadeledeki uygulamasını araştırmaktadır. Literatür’ün 
kavramı anlama açısından eksik kaldığı düşünüldüğü için bu çalışma gerekli 
görülmüştür. Yapılan araştırma sonucunda kavramın sadece ayaklanma ve terör ile 
mücadelede uygulanmadığı tarihte din ve siyaset biliminde de yer aldığı ortaya 
çıkmıştır. Söz konusu çalışma, kalpleri ve akılları kazanmak kavramının 
kullanımındaki eksikleri beş öğe oluşturarak incelemektedir. Bahsi geçen öğelerin 
geçerliliği ise ikili gruplardan oluşan vaka çalışmalarıyla incelenmektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kalpleri ve Akılları Kazanmak, Baskı, İkna, Ayaklanma, 
Terörizm 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A state intervention based solely on hard measures in a territory of another state with 
an aim of coping with terrorism/insurgency fall short of success in contemporary era. 
Since, the center of gravity of wars should be winning hearts and minds of the tar-
geted population
1
 presently. Previously, the use of coercion and initiation of fear on 
the public were regarded as the best strategies to win a war. Yet, in contemporary era 
the consent of populations of the intervening and the intervened country are required 
for success. In this regard, there is a need to understand the nature of winning hearts 
and minds.  
The western states started realizing the importance of using the utility of the concept 
of winning hearts and minds as terrorism is increased in contemporary era. Although 
the implementation of the concept traces back to early history, it has become a major 
                                                 
1
 Targeted population in this thesis refers to the population that a state attempts to win. In early history 
the targeted population is a state‟s own population. In World War I and World War II, the targeted 
population is the population of the opponent states. In Cold War, the targeted population is again the 
opponent state‟s population (In the Soviet Union case, it also encompasses the population of the satel-
lite states. In the struggle against terrorism, the targeted population is the population of the intervened 
country.   
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policy in the struggle against terrorism especially for western countries in present 
days. After September 11 attacks, Tony Blair and George W. Bush started to utilize 
the concept through their policies and statements. Consequently, there is an increase 
of interest in understanding of the concept in order to deal with terrorism/insurgency. 
The concept of winning hearts and minds is selected to investigate in this thesis, 
since the literature requires a research on the concept. The available literature on the 
concept of winning hearts and minds has concentrated mainly on the significance of 
soft power measures. But, there is a gap in literature on how to implement the con-
cept of winning hearts and minds in the struggle against terrorism. For this reason, a 
theoretical understanding of the concept of winning hearts and minds is necessary.  
The main question of this thesis is: “What is the nature of winning hearts and 
minds?” Under this question, there are four sub-questions that are going to be eva-
luated: 
Sub-Question 1. What is the history of winning hearts and minds? How far can the 
concept be traced? 
Sub-Question 2. What is the place of winning hearts and minds in the struggle 
against terrorism in contemporary era? 
Sub-Question 3. How has the concept of winning hearts and minds been operationa-
lized?
2
   
                                                 
2
 The operationalization of the concept of winning hearts and minds is assessed by the formulized 
components. The proposed components of winning hearts and minds are created in terms of their 
relevance and assistance to the concept. The literature on the concept does not involve such compo-
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Sub-Question 4. How can this operationalization of the concept of winning hearts 
and minds be observed and assessed in specific cases? 
The questions above are linked to each other in an organic manner. Therefore, they 
should be regarded not as four different questions but as a set of query that tries to 
reveal the nature of the concept of winning hearts and minds. In this regard, this the-
sis defends that without implementing the proposed components of winning hearts 
and minds, the policies of states would fall short of success. The components through 
which the concept has operationalized are (1) public diplomacy, (2) strategic com-
munication, (3) propaganda and psychological operations, (4) intelligence, (5) atti-
tude and behavior change. These components are the outcome of the history account 
of winning hearts and minds.  
The literature shows that heart is used for spiritual actions, which are the emotional 
phase of winning the targeted population to the side of the intervening state. For in-
stance, psychological operations appeal to the heart rather than the mind of the tar-
geted population. On the other hand, mind refers to a more materialistic phase in 
which the targeted population could witness concrete result of the policies of an in-
tervening state. In the mind phase, securing the population from the adversary
3
, mak-
                                                                                                                                          
nents. However, to evaluate and operationalize the concept of winning hearts and minds to the state 
policies, the proposed components are necessary.  
3
In this thesis the adversaries are the insurgents and/or terrorists in a country. Besides, if not men-
tioned differently, winning hearts and minds of a targeted population regards to win the people inside 
an intervened country, who do not chose neither to be on the side of the insurgent nor to be with the 
government. Only in London and Madrid Bombings (see Chapter V) the targeted population is the 
domestic population that the concerning states employ domestic policies to win the hearts and minds 
of the Muslim community inside their borders.      
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ing infrastructures, building schools are the most prominent examples of tangible 
changes. Such policies help an intervening state to win the population on their side. 
Kilcullen (2004, see Appendix C: 4) argues that hearts means to persuade “the popu-
lation that its interests are best served by cooperating with the occupation” and minds 
means to convince the “people that the coalition forces will win the conflict.” This 
thesis argues that the term hearts emerges from a historical perspective in which the 
term is shaped through sensitivity of the population on certain issues rather than state 
policies. In this respect, heart refers to personal, cultural, societal motivations and 
shared experiences of the targeted population. On the other hand, the term minds 
emerge from rationality and reasoning of the population.  
The overall aim of this thesis is to introduce the content of winning hearts and minds, 
such as where it had firstly occurred, in which context it was used and how it was 
transformed throughout the history. Besides, this thesis aims to create the compo-
nents of winning hearts and minds, since the current literature does not specify them.  
This thesis is based firstly on a descriptive analysis where the evaluation of winning 
hearts and minds is pursued in general and secondly on an analytical approach to 
observe the practice of the term. The thesis depends on three main methodological 
grounds. It initiates with a historical narrative in which the history is observed as it 
is. Historical research on winning hearts and minds shows the events where the con-
cept is used in the past. In this regard, the Campaigns of Alexander the Great by Ar-
rian, a well known historian, is the origin of the historical research of the thesis.  
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Later, the political philosophers and strategists, such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and 
Rousseau are analyzed by using content analysis method. The works of these writers 
are significant to examine the concept of winning hearts and minds. These works 
generally stress the importance of consent and persuasion
4
 in winning the targeted 
population.  
Last but not the least, this thesis uses comparative case study method to examine 
whether winning hearts and minds has been a useful policy for contemporary terror-
ism and insurgency. Of this point, the proposed components of winning hearts and 
minds are used to examine the concept.  
This thesis utilizes documentary research, mainly governmental records, memoranda, 
speeches and declarations as primary sources; whereas, books and articles are used as 
secondary sources.  
Chapter II evaluates the history of winning hearts and minds in regards to the evalua-
tion and formation of the concept in the history. In this regard, the era of Pericles 
shows the value of consent and the significance of public opinion under the rule of a 
statesman. Further, consent and persuasion can be seen in the campaigns of Alexan-
der the Great. After Pericles and Alexander the Great, the usage of winning hearts 
and minds shifts from population centric to a religious centric discourse. The Book 
of Common Prayer of the Church of England wrote about winning hearts and minds 
under the context of converting a person‟s heart and mind to Jesus Christ. After this 
                                                 
4
 In Clausewitz and Sun Tzu‟s understanding of warfare deception and coercive methods to win a war 
are also important. Considering the structure of old wars, these concept may work as well. However, 
in the contemporary era coercion and deception seems to be ineffective on the intervened population, 
especially in the struggle against terrorism.   
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practice, the concept has not been verbally used for a long period in history in the 
religious context.  
Later, strategists attached great importance to the practice of winning hearts and 
minds through their writings and advised the rulers to be aware of the concept. In 
1519-1520 Machiavelli formulated the “rumor theory” and the implementation of 
deception in warfare to obtain towns that were disloyal to the ruler. In addition to 
Machiavelli, Clausewitz in 18
th
 century recommended winning hearts and minds 
implicitly. The targeted subject of winning hearts and minds in the 18
th
 century was 
the soldiers rather than the whole population. During that time, the concept was prac-
ticed in war conditions. In the 20
th
 century, Mao Tse-tung expressed the significance 
of population while dealing with insurgencies. With reference to Mao Tse-tung‟s 
understanding of winning hearts and minds, the targeted subject became the whole 
population.  
Chapter III examines the contemporary usage of winning hearts and minds, seeking 
its place in World War II and Cold War period. Although the involved states were 
relying on hard power in battlefield during World War II, they also started using the 
components of winning hearts and minds on opponent‟s (targeted) population. In this 
sense, the main aim of using the components of winning hearts and minds was to 
make the opponent‟s population fed up with war. During the Cold War, the explicit 
usage of the concept in counter-insurgency struggles had formulated the contempo-
rary conceptualization of the concept in a concrete manner. The Soviet Union and the 
U.S. applied propaganda and psychological warfare, intelligence, and strategic com-
munication methods on the population of the other party during that period. Histori-
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cal research on winning hearts and minds provides to formulate the proposed com-
ponents in which Chapter IV examines and clarifies them more in detail.   
Chapter IV formulates five components of winning hearts and minds. These compo-
nents are public diplomacy, strategic communication, propaganda and psychological 
operations, attitude and behavioral change and intelligence. This chapter suggests 
that the components of winning hearts and minds would not work efficiently to win a 
war, if they are considered individually. Therefore, the main contribution of this the-
sis to the literature can be the introduction of the proposed components and their re-
lations to the concept. In the literature, all of the above components are assessed in-
dependent from the concept of winning hearts and minds. Yet, the historical research 
on the concept shows that there are certain policy methods that states should apply in 
order to win a population. For instance, dropping leaflets in intervened countries‟ 
territory (the use of propaganda) and the creation of Radio Free Europe (the use of 
strategic communication) were applied to win the targeted population during the 
Cold War. Moreover, when the question “why do states utilize those components 
during interventions?” is asked, the clear answer would be to win the hearts and 
minds of the intervened (targeted) population.  
Chapter V relies on two sets of case studies that are formulated in two branches The 
proposed components of winning hearts and minds are examined in these sets of case 
studies. These sets are further divided into two sub-sets. The aim of dividing the case 
studies into two sub-sets is to demonstrate the policies of governments in insurgen-
cies and terrorism within a comparative frame. On this issue, the first set of cases, 
which are Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency, are the two comparative case stu-
 8 
 
dies. After stating the historical overview of the two conflicts, this section of the 
chapter examines those wars in terms of the success and failure of the strategy of 
winning hearts and minds on the targeted population. In the second set of cases, 
London and Madrid bombings are analyzed; yet again, in terms of state policies on 
the success or failure of winning the Muslim population but inside their country, af-
ter the attacks
5
. Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency show an interference of a 
state to a territory of another state; whereas, London and Madrid Bombings present 
the effect of policies to win the Muslim population inside the country with reference 
to domestic policies of the states.  
Chapter VI is the concluding part that summarizes the nature of the concept of win-
ning hearts and minds. In this regard, the components of winning hearts and minds 
and their interactions with the concept are seen to be valuable to win a war that is 
based on insurgency or terrorism. The practice of the proposed components during 
Malayan Emergency, generally intelligence gathering, propaganda and minimum use 
of force, shows the necessity of the concept. Whereas, the Vietnam War, where the 
components are not used in effect, fell short of success. It is concluded that the signi-
ficance of the proposed components changes from case to case. This chapter con-
cludes with recommendations to further research on the concept of winning hearts 
and minds.   
                                                 
5
 London and Madrid Bombings are the comparative case studies that are examined in terms of states 
domestic policies. This section of the thesis aims to observe whether the components of winning 
hearts and minds be applicable to the states‟ own population.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
ROOTS OF WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IN 
EARLY HISTORY 
 
 
This chapter aims to evaluate the practice of winning hearts and minds on the basis 
of early historical occasions and philosophical writings. Since the first usage of the 
concept as a whole was during the Malayan Emergency in 1948 by General Templer, 
exploration of the concept in history could cause “anachronism.” Anachronism by 
definition is utilizing a concept or a term to a timeframe, even though the concept has 
not been seen or used on that era yet. It creates an error in chronological order that 
scholars sometimes avoid. To bear anachronism in mind the aim of searching the 
roots of winning hearts and minds is not to reinterpret the course of the history, but to 
investigate whether the concept can be traced back to ancient time.  
It would not be incorrect to claim that the practice of the concept can be traced back 
to the emergence of the state. The existence of human being can be seen as the basis 
of winning hearts and minds as well, since communication has been an indispensible 
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part of daily life. Based upon this, human beings by their very nature need to com-
municate with each other in certain tasks to maintain their existence. During these 
tasks coercion or persuasion occurred. Therefore, the emergence of communication, 
namely the dialogue among the human beings, has created the first practice of win-
ning hearts and minds with the aim of tackling the obstacles to survive in nature.    
 
2.1 Pericles and the Will of the Public on the way to Winning Hearts and Minds: 
The concept of winning hearts and minds is formed on the political arena in the Clas-
sical Greek history. Started by his rule, Pericles (495 – 429 BC) a sophisticated 
Athenian statesman, had granted the citizens to live under a true democracy. The 
voting system in which the majority decides on the proceedings had increased Pe-
ricles‟s power. As Fox (2006: 142-44) puts forward about the era of Pericles:  
Someone, therefore, who could win the people‟s trust would be far more effective 
than an old-fashioned aristocrat, however brave he might be in war and athletics and 
however well connected in the wider Greek world. 
 
According to Fox (2006: 142-144), Pericles managed to get the support by commu-
nication, which is called “public speaking”6. Based on Pericles‟s understanding, in 
Athenian democracy the wish of the population prevailed the will of the statesmen. 
In the same era, novels had also showed the link of the population with statecraft. As 
Dodds (2004: 17-18) writes, Homer had shaped the strength of his characters through 
                                                 
6
 On communication skills, Plato had labeled Pericles as a “demagogue”, whereas Thucydides ad-
mired his intelligence. At the final stage, Pericles was successful at diverting public opinion. Whether 
he was a “demagogue” or an admirable public speaker, is not related to the investigation of the thesis.  
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public opinion. These characters achieved their strengths by political counsel or by 
battle. Consequently, the will of the public on decision making appeared to the fore-
front of political arena. This situation constituted the background for the concept of 
winning hearts and minds and its reliance on the population support. 
 
2.2 Philip II and Alexander the Great in relation to Winning Hearts and Minds: 
As Fox (2006: 188) states Alexander the Great, son of Philip II, obtained his skills 
from his father. Philip II, before fighting Spartans, had established good relations 
with “neighboring” Athenian cities to pull Sparta easily down. Due to this reason, he 
sent out “money, arms and mercenaries” to Greek cities under the name of friendship 
(Fox 2006: 188-89). In contemporary comprehension, the acts of Philip II can be 
considered as winning the minds by serving goods that the neighboring cities were 
deprived of.  
Likewise, Alexander the Great followed the path of his father with a slight differ-
ence. Alexander was more confident and successful than his father in his campaigns. 
In the translation of Sélincourt (1971) of the book The Campaigns of Alexander, Ar-
rian assesses the achievements of Alexander the Great through his campaigns. As a 
general aim, Alexander the Great had fought for the status of Leader of Persia. He 
followed his ferocious foe Darius, the king of Persia, all through his conquests. He 
won many battles in Asia, was injured several times. He had defeated Darius and 
achieved the title of Leader of all Asia. During his campaigns, he was respected of 
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being a stable person in attitude. He could have done anything to get the public to his 
side. To achieve such an end he was gentle to the conquered population. 
Gentle actions of Alexander the Great were supportive to accomplish his conquests 
not only to gain territory, but also to get the population to his side. He generally did 
not regulate the taxes of the conquered cities. He kept the taxes at the same level to 
prevent further revolts. Even in some instances, he had asked indigenous people to 
come back from mountains and surrender (Sélincourt, 1971: 76). In return he had 
permitted those people to stay in their villages and continue their life. With this act, 
Alexander intended to win the conquered population‟s hearts and minds. In this 
manner, his aim was not to loot the conquered city but to organize it (Sélincourt, 
1971: 76).  
Although Aristotle had “advised the young king to behave towards the Greeks as a 
leader but towards „barbarians‟ as a master”, Alexander rejected his tutor‟s advise. 
He was just, to all communities. In the Hellenistic period, Greeks and Macedonians 
had the status of being a country of west, whereas Persians and Asians were per-
ceived as barbarians, who were inferior in status and should not be interlinked to any 
western structure. Alexander had changed this policy by integrating “Macedonian 
army” into Persian forces (Sélincourt (trans.), 1971: 31).  
Moreover, according to a text on Macedonian history (Smitha, 1998), Alexander was 
gentle to the non-Greek ethnics. After conquering their lands, he did not put them 
into slavery. In some instances as in Miletus, he offered power to local Greek citi-
zens to connect them to himself, where he had witnessed resistance (Smitha, 1998). 
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According to Shortsleeve, a Major in United States Air Forces, Alexander the Great 
won the hearts and minds of the people in conquered cities by “encouraging inter-
marriage of the Greeks and the people” (Shortsleeve, 2005: 25). Even Alexander 
himself married a Persian woman named Roxanne. One of the prominent changes of 
Alexander the Great, after the marriage, as Diodorus put it in the documentary of 
Lindsay (2004), was his behavior. According to the claim of Diodorus, Alexander the 
Great dressed up “in a white robe and a Persian‟s sash after he captured Persepolis” 
(Lindsay 2004). Macedonians were offended by Alexander the Great‟s attitudes 
(Lindsay 2004). Besides, some generals created unrest inside Macedonia. Even if 
Alexander aimed to get the Persian people on his side, he could not assess his own 
population‟s opinion. This gives clues on the fragileness of winning hearts and 
minds. 
According to a research paper written by Shortsleeve (2005), Alexander used all the 
“instruments of power” to win the hearts and minds of the Asian people. Yet Short-
sleeve (2005) goes further and cites John F.C. Fuller who claims that during the con-
quest of Persia, Alexander had distinguished the defeat of the Persian army from the 
Persian population (cited in Shortsleeve, 2005: 11). As Shortsleeve said “the defeat 
of the army was his [Alexander‟s] strategic aim, the winning over the people his po-
litical aim” (Shortsleeve, 2005: 10).  
In general, Alexander‟s actions show that winning hearts and minds is a population 
focused concept. In this focus, the population that is considered can be the interfer-
er‟s own population or the intervened population. From the actions of Alexander the 
Great, the significance of the two can be observed.     
 14 
 
2.3 Religion in relation to winning hearts and minds: 
Winning hearts and minds is practiced not only in the practices of the states but also 
in religion. The concept is used in religion in 1599 as a mean to get the believers to 
the love of God. This reasoning is explicit in The Book of Common Prayer (Philip-
pians, 4:7) as: “The peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your 
hearts and minds through Jesus Christ.” 
There are several interpretations of the above verse. From all different kinds, the Ge-
neva Bible Notes interprets those verses as (see Center for Reformed Theology and 
Apologetics website):  
That great quietness of mind, which God alone gives in Christ. He divides the 
mind into the heart, that is, into that part which is the seat of the will and af-
fections, and into the higher part, by which we understand the reason about 
matters
7
.  
With this interpretation, winning hearts and minds locates in sacred book, to guide 
the true believers to the right way of God. According to this definition, heart resem-
bles the emotional motivation, whereas mind resembles the deeper cause of the is-
sues which interlinks heart and mind to get the affective result. The concept‟s prac-
tice in religion explains that hearts and minds has not been merely a strategic term 
but a concept that transforms. In this transformation, hearts and minds is utilized as a 
tool. The aim was to convince the intended population to be a true believer.  
                                                 
7
 Emphasis added. 
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Lee (2009) analyzes the concept hearts and minds on religion through a theoretical 
framework. From Lee (2009)‟s understanding Pascal, a 17th century French philoso-
pher, had questioned the “truths of religious nature” by taking „reason and heart‟ as 
the two prominent variables. According to Lee, Pascal assumed that heart is “other 
than a rational mindset” (Lee, 2009: 338). With Pascal‟s hypothesis, Lee (2009) con-
cluded that to be a true believer reason should not be the driving force; but it is the 
heart that directs human beings on religion. In this process, heart does not only feel 
but also knows the true reality. Lee (2009: 342) situates Pascal‟s view of heart in a 
“metaphorical” way. He stresses that heart does not combine only the emotional 
phases of the human being, but it is also the “center of operation”, affects the 
“thoughts and will (Lee 2009: 342). Approaching from Lee‟s point, even reason is 
affected by the assessment of heart.   
Winning hearts and minds on religious discourse is a tool to persuade the targeted 
population for the cause of the interveners. Examining theology is significant, since 
16
th
 century conjuncture was influenced by religious discourse. It can be concluded 
that winning hearts and minds was applied by the necessities of conjuncture of the 
related era.  
 
2.4 Political Discourse on Winning Hearts and Minds in 18
th
 Century:                                                                                                             
In the state level, consent of the population and to persuade them through coercion 
prevail the roots of winning hearts and minds to get a population. The former is the 
most desirable way for the intervener. 
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According to the arguments offered by Gourevitch (1997) on Rousseau
8
, there are 
three different kinds of will in ruling apparatus. The first one is the individual’s own 
will, stemming from other people‟s conditions. The second one is the common will, 
comes from society to the prince or the governor. The third one is the sovereign will 
that comes from society to state. According to Gourevitch on Rousseau‟s writings, an 
individual never renounces upon his particular will as a human being but gives his 
consent to the sovereign to rule; and to the state to check the ruler‟s administration 
(Gourevitch 1997: 87). The prince, for instance, has legitimate reasons either to pu-
nish or convince the public through persuasive measures. However, it is the sove-
reign power, the higher branch of the pyramid that regulates prince‟s actions and 
prevents prince‟s personal desires on people. The sovereign power consists of the 
consent of society. However, a prince may use the population for his own interest. 
Besides, rulers cannot put pressure to “win men‟s hearts” on every individual (Gou-
revitch, 1762: 11-12). The former stance can well be seen, when Rousseau (cited in 
Gourevitch 1997: 95) observed that:  
A political sermonizer may well tell them [Princes] that since the people‟s 
force is their force, their greater interest is to have the people flourishing, nu-
merous, formidable; they know perfectly well that this is not true. Their per-
sonal interest is first of all that the People be weak, wretched, and never able 
to resist them. 
 
Moreover, in accordance with Gourevitch‟s conceptualization of Rousseau on theory, 
general will is always right; and common good rules the particular will. For instance, 
if the will of an individual clashes with the general will, the general will would pre-
                                                 
8
In the following arguments references on Rousseau is taken from the book The Social Contract and 
Other Later Political Writings, which is translated and edited by Gourevitch (1997).  
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vail and the „individual will‟ would diminish; therefore, the latter should not be taken 
seriously. In contemporary era, the particular will cannot be separated from common 
good; and such a separation creates radicalization on the individual level.  
Moreover, as Gourevitch (1997) states, Rousseau believed that giving consent to the 
sovereign on purpose, would produce a relatively secure environment. Although the 
presumed social contract of J. J. Rousseau is an imaginary one, it gives clues on the 
creation of peaceful conditions inside the borders of a state. Along with the need of 
consent, citizens would defend their country only when they adopt the territory as 
their “fatherland.” The image of a fatherland emphasizes the implementation of 
hearts and minds.   
Besides, in Discourse on Political Economy,
9
 Rousseau explicitly states that even the 
rulers cannot put pressure to “win men‟s hearts” on every individual (Gourevitch, 
1997: 11-12). Nonetheless, the book does not cover what would happen, if the given 
consent is taken away.  
The understanding of Rousseau provides the necessity of population. The signific-
ance of getting the consent from the ruled population is associated to the concept of 
winning hearts and minds. It can be derived from the political discourse that rulers 
should consider the will of their population. In this respect, the concept of winning 
hearts and minds is directed to the domestic population rather than a foreign one.    
 
                                                 
9
 The Discourse on Political Economy is translated in Gourevitch (1997: 3-39) 
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2.5 Strategic Studies and Winning Hearts and Minds 
 
2.5.1 Sun Tzu on Winning the Soldiers Hearts and Minds 
The components of winning hearts and minds (see Chapter VI) have their roots in 
strategic studies by Sun-Tzu. According to Giles translation on Sun Tzu, “warfare is 
based on deception” (Giles 1910: 2-5) and a virtuous leader should win a war with-
out having a battle and both “direct and indirect methods of attack” are valuable to 
win a battle. The harmony of the two would lead to extensive maneuver (Giles 1910: 
11).  
Considering the era of Sun Tzu by being cognizant of conventional warfare struc-
tures, it is surprising to observe the motivation of winning the heart of soldiers in 
war times. According to Giles on Sun Tzu, generals should behave in mercy to the 
soldiers as if they are the soldiers‟ “children” (Giles, 1910 22-25). Such an act would 
result in loyalty to the generals. Although Sun Tzu did not extend his work by creat-
ing links on each point, he had shown the basics of warfare. Since the logic in Art of 
War captures the military phase of war, applying negative methods, such as decep-
tion and misinformation, on the population in contemporary would not be valuable. 
Nonetheless, Sun Tzu provides the necessity to win the hearts and minds of the sol-
diers. On the investigation of winning hearts and minds in history, the reference point 
of whose hearts and minds always changes. In this regard, the reference point be-
comes the soldiers.   
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2.5.2 Carl von Clausewitz on Winning the Soldiers Hearts and Minds 
On the characteristic of modern warfare, the “heart” of a nation is regarded as a no-
tion that can change the very course of the “war potentials, politics and fighting 
strength”; therefore, “Clausewitz warned the governments to be cognizant of the 
power of heart in a nation” (Howard and Paret 1993: 258). According to Clausewitz, 
deducted from the translation of Howard and Paret, heart has two forms. First is the 
heart of an army; the other one is the heart of a nation. The heart of a nation is its will 
to fight. The heart of the army is the center of gravity, which is called to be the 
strongest value of an army, where artillery units, command and control systems are 
located. 
Clausewitz was more in favor of the conditions of troops and artillery numbers, 
meaning the operational phase of the war rather than the population. From this 
stance, the vital tenets in old wars were to acquire the territory of the enemy in which 
the skill of the soldiers and artillery were the most prominent factors. Considering 
the era of Clausewitz, the quantity of the troops also played a vital role to win the 
wars. Besides, war combines the entire nation regardless of civilians (Howard and 
Paret, 1993). Yet, the concept of winning hearts and minds found its value through 
the virtues of commanders on soldiers to augment the will to fight during the war 
(Howard and Paret, 1993: 220). Therefore, the “military spirit in every soldier‟s 
heart that goes beyond bravery must be the duty of a commander” (Howard and Pa-
ret, 1993: 220).  
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Morality was the other element of wars. The moral factors unite people into “mass of 
force” and this has a psychological base: the will. Hence, it is harder to win “people 
in arms” than armies   (Howard and Paret, 1993: 216-221).  
From the military perspective, cunning and intelligence were the basic tools during 
the operational phase of conventional wars. These methods are considered in the the-
sis as the components to win hearts and minds of the population. Therefore, one of 
the basic components of winning hearts and minds, intelligence gathering, had traced 
back to conventional era. Besides, communication was a strategy in conventional 
wars too. Unlike the contemporary era, where words should abide by the actions of 
states, Handel (1989) discusses, Clausewitz‟s communication strategy and the way it 
led to deception as “… but words, being cheap, are the most common means of creat-
ing false impressions.”              
Stemming the idea from Howard and Paret‟s (1993) book, although Clausewitz sug-
gested the vitality of masses during war conditions, he regarded the army rather than 
civilians. This was the logic of conventional wars in which the center of gravity was 
to hit the enemy forces from the core in order to fracture the courage and power of 
the adversary to retaliate. Nevertheless at about hundred years after Clausewitz‟s 
writings, Colmar von der Goltz
10
, both a Prussian soldier and a writer, tried to shift 
the center of gravity from soldier specific logic to a people based one, especially by 
saying “it is the conflict of interests that leads to war, but the passions of peoples 
determine how far the war must be pushed outside all consideration of interest” 
                                                 
10
 Colmar von der Goltz was a soldier who joined in Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 on the Prussian 
side.  Later in 1883 he had the duty to modernize the Ottoman army, which had enabled him to get the 
rank of Field Marshal.   
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(Goltz, 1994, 809). Yet, Goltz (1994) also had the common reasoning similar to 
Clausewitz: annihilation of the opponent as the major goal.  
 
2.6 Democracy and Winning Hearts and Minds in 19
th
 Century: 
In 19
th
 century, the term hearts and minds transformed more into the framework of 
democracy. On this point Alexis de Tocqueville used hearts and minds both separate-
ly and together quite often in his two major works: Democracy in America, the Old 
Regime and the Revolution
11
.  
The writings of Tocqueville on democracy, equality and liberalism considering the 
U.S. are one of the milestones of social theory. Horwitz referred to Tocqueville on 
the term “tyranny of the majority” with a slight change in the meaning: “the tyranny 
of the unanimity” (Horwitz, 1966: 304-305). According to Horwitz, Tocqueville ob-
served tyranny in dichotomous terms: the tyranny of the government on the public, 
the tyranny of majority over the government. As indicated by Reeve‟s translation of 
Tocqueville (Reeve, 2003), Tocqueville states that to escape from the former, indi-
viduals ought to bind by associations among each other. Associations would even-
tually create a civil society frame. So that, individuals be exempted from govern-
ment‟s coercive actions. In this respect, Tocqueville rest his views on the voluntary 
accumulation of individuals under an association, where “feelings and opinions are 
recruited, the heart is enlarged and the human mind is developed by no other means 
                                                 
11
 The translated versions by Henry Reeve and John Bonner of the books are reviewed. 
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than by the reciprocal influence of men upon each other” (Reeve, 2003: 583). Fur-
thermore, the flow of opinions cannot be controlled easily in a democratic state. In 
parallel, the ideas of individuals will flourish “into the minds or hearts of all around 
[others]” effortlessly (Reeve, 2003: 584). Thus, associations among the people 
should be like checks and balances. Besides, hearts and minds can be the road to 
achieve the ultimate end, which is to create a unity among the public.  
To exempt from “tyranny of unanimity12”, states should act from the heart (emotions 
and feelings), rather than solely by rationality (mind) in politics; so to refrain from 
“the impoverishment of citizens‟ souls” and to prevent “despotism” (Hoffman, 2003: 
272). Therefore, the objective of the government should be to keep individual identi-
ty alive and the way to achieve this is by emphasizing emotionality more.  
On the argument of “tyranny of the unanimity”, John Stuart Mill opposed to Tocque-
ville‟s view that tyranny comes “not over the body, but over the mind” (Mill, 1864: 
118). When Mill (1864) stated the relationship of body and mind, he did not evaluate 
the reasoning behind it. An interpretation on mind from the conceptualization of 
Tocqueville is easier to grasp than the heart. What he probably meant by the tyranny 
over the mind is the gathering of ideas to oppose a government. 
Other than the use of heart and minds in his books, on a letter to a friend regarding 
his reliance more on the individual than to the institutions, Tocqueville said (cited in 
Herr, 1962: 35-36):  
                                                 
12
 Tyranny of unanimity is to coerce the government. 
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… and I am thoroughly convinced that political societies are not what their 
laws make them but what they are prepared in advance to be by the feelings, 
the beliefs, the ideas, the habits of heart and mind of the men who compose 
them. 
Therefore, a democratic state should be cognizant of its compositions that are the 
habits of individuals‟ thinking and evaluating processes. Besides, “citizens should 
rely on their souls” [feelings to unite them in terms of being a society] to abstain 
from driving into despotism (Herr, 1962: 35).  
Moreover, The Old Regime and the Revolution refers to the economists
13
 and their 
conceptualization of state and the society before the French Revolution. According to 
the economists (Bonner, 1856: 197), a state should shape the characteristics of the 
society as following: 
The state, said the economists, must not only govern, it must shape the nation. 
It must form a mind of citizens conformably to a preconceived model. It is its 
duty to fill their minds with such opinions and their hearts with such feelings 
as it may judge necessary. It must transform as well as reform its subjects; 
perhaps even create new subjects, if it thinks fits.   
 
The state centric approach is obviously stated in the former view. Moreover, the 
above statement indicates the proposed component of winning hearts and minds, 
which is attitude and behavioral change as the statement regards to shape hearts and 
the minds of a society. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Economists are school of writers before the French Revolution, who conceptualizes state and the 
individual from economical perspective. They are also known as the physiocrats.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONTEMPORARY USE OF WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS 
 
 
Historical search on hearts and minds shows that the implementation of the concept 
has changed according to the necessities of states. The usage has evolved more to-
wards terrorism in the contemporary world. This chapter covers the 20
th
 century and 
onwards, tracing the history of hearts and minds both as a concept and as a practice. 
The conceptual framework settled down in revolutionary warfare and terrorism lite-
rature in general. Particularly the U.S. politicians and presidents use the concept 
through their speeches on the issues such as the rule of democracy and fight against 
terrorism.  
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3.1 Insurgency and Terrorism with respect to Winning Hearts and Minds: 
In the 20
th
 century, Mao Tse-tung
14
 directly put forward the importance of winning 
hearts and minds, with regards to Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 
Second Sino-Japanese War. In this regard, On Guerilla Warfare Tse-tung (Maoist 
Documentation Project, 2000) addressed guerrilla warfare as an “independent form 
of warfare” which implied the fact that invaders should not underestimate the gueril-
la‟s political motivation merely on military means. The population is the key factor 
to organize the masses of people under guerilla activity (Maoist Documentation 
Project, 1937:1-19). In accordance, the cliché in literature regarding the significance 
of winning hearts and minds stems from Mao‟s well-known sentence (Maoist Docu-
mentation Project, 2000: 31), as follows: 
Many people think it is impossible for guerillas to exist for long in the ene-
my‟s rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that 
should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to 
water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How many it be said that these two 
cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people 
their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.  
 
This cliché finds its form in scholarly writings (Kroenig and et al. 2009: 23) as: 
“Since insurgents must move through the people like fish move through the water, a 
hearts and minds campaign is designed to drain the sea of popular support in which 
the counterinsurgent fish swim.”     
                                                 
14
 The translated version of On Guerilla Warfare can be found online in: 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ (accessed on June 10, 
2010) 
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Besides, the cliché was re-shaped with reference to terrorism by Margaret Thatcher, 
as follows: “Democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the 
hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend” (as cited in Hibbert, 2006: 
32). Thatcher shifted the center from population to publicity that the terrorist organi-
zations depend on. In general, seek for publicity has two major aims. The first one is 
to vindicate the validity of a terrorist cause. The second is to inflict fear on the in-
tended public through attacks. Therefore, both of the aims address the intended pub-
lic as their subject. 
Insurgents in 20
th
 century fought in an asymmetric way to provide political legitima-
cy. Their cause relied mainly on beliefs and ideologies. Therefore, the counter-
insurgency methods, which were depended purely on military force, fell short of suc-
cess due to two reasons: (1) the insurgents knew the terrain better than the counter-
insurgent military forces. (2) The intervened population chose to be on the side of the 
insurgent group due to the emergence of civilian deaths.  
From the perspective of the intervened population, the insurgent group‟s cause is 
legitimate especially when the government cannot satisfy the needs of its citizens 
(Galula, 2006). Indeed, civilians can be considered as the backyard of insurgent 
groups where they can recruit new people to their cause. Surprisingly, the same 
backyard can be used to inflict fear and chaos among the public. States realize that 
military superiority per se is not sufficient to win an asymmetrical warfare. Hence, 
this awareness directs government‟s domestic and foreign policies further towards 
winning hearts and minds of the targeted population.      
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3.2 World War II in regard to Winning Hearts and Minds: 
During World War I and World War II, decision-makers relied more on the military 
dimension of war. Yet, different ways of propaganda and psychological warfare oc-
curred in both of the world wars. In this regard, Speier (1948) questioned the practice 
of propaganda and psychological warfare merely in world wars. He had differen-
tiated propaganda into two forms as “tactical” and “strategic” propaganda. The for-
mer is “directed at enemy soldiers”, whereas the latter is directed at the public. Spei-
er (1948) concluded the article by emphasizing the necessity of peace time propa-
ganda activities, which should be achieved by strategic propaganda. 
The logic of the leaders throughout the world wars differed from each other. For in-
stance, Förster (2003: 322) argues that Hitler explained the defeat of Germany in 
World War I as a result of the lack in “will power” of the masses and “morale” of the 
soldiers. According to Förster, on Hitler‟s argumentation about wars, the “will pow-
er” is the main course of “future warfare” in which “mass consent” is the pre-
requisite to win a war (Förster, 2003: 322). Furthermore, Föster (2003:325-327) dis-
cusses that “war aims” operates as a “mobilization of hearts and minds for a unified 
national attitude.” Moreover, World War II was lost from the German side because 
“German hearts and minds” was not taken into consideration (Förster, 2003: 325-
327).  
Beginning with the world wars, a new era on the shape of the warfare was initiated, 
in which battles occurred not only within the frontiers but also within the hearts and 
minds of the people. Joseph Goebbels (1934), The Minister of Propaganda of Hitler, 
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was cognizant of the “power of the people”. He stated that the “power” of a modern 
state comes not only from “weapons” but also from “winning and holding the heart 
of a nation.” In support of Goebbels‟ statement (1934), Ludendorff, a German offic-
er, stressed the value of words as follows: “Words are battles to-day. The right word 
is a battle won. The wrong one is a battle lost” (Ludendorff, 1920: 557). 
 Besides, propaganda in Germany was carried out by leaflets, posters and magazines. 
The methods of propaganda on the enemy stressed the inevitable “German victory” 
and the “encouragement of pacifism in enemy” (Lutz, 1933:500-501). On the other 
hand, the war propaganda to the German public was on “self defense” and “high cul-
ture of Germans” (Lutz, 1933: 500-501).  
As a propaganda method, during World War II, a magazine named Signal had been 
“translated into 25 languages” (Bytwerk 2007). Besides, leaflets, written towards the 
American soldiers in English, were effective as well. The below leaflet
15
 (Bytwerk 
2001) shows the implications of the leaflet propaganda which aimed to lessen the 
morale and the will to fight of the American soldiers: 
                                                 
15
 Since the below leaflet has a copywriter material, the author‟s permission is obtained via e-mail on 
June 3, 2010. 
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Figure 1. German Leaflet during World War II 
 
During World War II, propaganda was a new concept to rely on and Hitler could not 
effectively implement it. According to Speier (1948: 6), Hitler‟s speech in October 
1941 is a concrete example for his failure on propaganda methods, when Hitler de-
clared his victory in the East. Although, this was not the case in reality.  
World War II produced a new perspective in international politics. States ceased their 
conceptualization on conventional warfare. Different strategies began to dominate 
the minds of the decision makers. Within this line of thought, psychological warfare, 
propaganda, cultural exchanges and strategic communication became the most in-
fluential mechanisms for influencing the public opinion in other countries (Osgood, 
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2002: 85). Moreover, new wars started to be a “battle waged for the hearts and minds 
of the peoples” (Bjelajac, 1962: 74; Osgood, 2002: 86).  
 
3.3 Cold War and Winning Hearts and Minds: 
Throughout the Cold War, states experienced significant liberation movements, revo-
lutionary and guerilla warfare. The strength of Communist ideology relied on mass 
support. Therefore, the revolutionary warfare strategies “fought for the minds of 
people” in the aim of “closeness and appeal to people” (Bjelajac, 1962: 79). On the 
other hand, Truman with the “Campaign of Truth”, aimed to show the people under 
Soviet influence the “reality”. The campaign proved to be successful with the sup-
port of radio broadcastings. However, Coste (1950), who worked under Romanian 
diplomatic service in Washington for thirteen years, wrote that the “truth” itself 
would not be adequate to win the Eastern European people on the side of the U.S. 
Since those people were subjugated by the Soviet Union, they were in need of assis-
tance and military support for revolution. The logic behind the argument of Coste 
found its expression as follows: “propaganda itself cannot lead to the liberation of 
Eastern European peoples” (1950-1951: 645). However, the resistance movements in 
Eastern Europe proved the opposite reality that propaganda would be sufficient to 
win a war. 
Another campaign throughout the Cold War era was the establishment of CIA and its 
overt and covert operations. Although radio channels were of vital importance to 
obtain the mind of the audience by the “Campaign of Truth”, CIA‟s actions were 
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directed towards both the hearts and minds of the people. For instance, CIA‟s covert 
action during the Italian elections of 1948 was a successful case. As Barnes elabo-
rated; to prevent the Communist Party‟s success in Italy, CIA directed “10 million $ 
[U.S. dollars] taken from economic stabilization fund to pay for local election cam-
paigns, anti-communist propaganda and to bribes” (Barnes, 1981: 412). 
Letters to Italy was another initiative to win the hearts and minds of Italian citizens. 
As Martinez and Suchman (1950) stated, Americans in Italian origin, who had fami-
ly, relatives or close contacts in Italy wrote letters to express the freedom in the U.S. 
and the lovely atmosphere of liberty by their own experiences. The effect of the 
campaign relied more on the psychological dimension. The campaign sought to elim-
inate the possibility of the rule of Communist Party. Hence to send letters from 
someone that the receiver knows and trusts was the best way to achieve the objective 
(Martinez and Suchman, 1950: 112). The campaign succeeded to reach the audience 
with a positive impact. Contrary to CIA‟s estimation for a possible victory of Com-
munist Party (Barnes 1981: 412), the elections produced positive results with regards 
to the U.S. interest.      
During the Eisenhower administration, the success of propaganda reached its peak. 
The campaign of “Crusade for Freedom” was employed in international arena over 
the minds of Soviet dominated peoples with the assistance of newly established 
“Jackson Committee”16 (see Parry-Giles, 1994). In Crusade for Freedom, freedom 
and liberty were regarded as the greatest benefits of the westernized countries in re-
                                                 
16
 In this issue, Parry-Giles phrased Jackson‟s speech at Princeton about psychological warfare on 
May 10, 1952, where Jackson said: “We created one or more salients into the hearts and minds of our 
friends behind the Iron Curtain…” (Parry-Giles, 1996: 295). 
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sponse to the Soviet hypocrisy. With the metaphor of a Freedom Bell, Crusade for 
Freedom was formed by the bell, which travelled the U.S. cities and then was located 
to West Berlin (Medhurst, 1997: 656-657). During its journey to different American 
cities, the Freedom Bell instilled hope and morale to the American public. Further-
more, its location as West Berlin symbolized the American belief on freedom and 
liberty in Germany and Eastern Europe. Therefore, in its essence, the Cold War was 
different from previous wars that had preceded it. The former was consisted of hu-
man element on top of military capability of states.        
During Cold War, the U.S. aimed to win the hearts and minds of Europe and Middle 
Eastern countries through materialistic methods. Truman Doctrine as well as Mar-
shall Plan was the prominent methods to contain the spread of communism. In this 
regard the “Domino Theory” was the leading approach, which was used both in 
Middle East and Far East. To bear in mind, on contrary to the U.S. strategy, Soviet 
Union was trying to flourish communism in the countries where it had sphere of in-
fluences. To win Cold War, winning hearts and minds of the foreign public was the 
prominent method. In this regard, the proposed component of winning hearts and 
minds, which is propaganda and psychological warfare played huge role during the 
Cold War period.   
 
3.4 The Discourse of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: 
Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) is a radio broadcasting channel, which 
was established in response to the necessities of Cold War structure. In order to grasp 
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the Cold War environment in depth, RFE/RL is crucial with reference to the impacts 
of propaganda and psychological operations to win the hearts and minds of commun-
ism oriented countries.  
The Cold War was a “battle of words, sounds and pictures” (Shaw, 2006: 1353), dri-
ven by the aim of “controlling” and mobilizing the public opinion at home and 
abroad” (Deery, 2001: 607). In parallel to Show‟s and Deery‟s description, the Tru-
man administration relied on a new broadcasting institution with the aim of provid-
ing “objective” information to the publics of Communist countries. Therefore, the 
major goal of the U.S. was not only to contain Soviet ideology via media but also 
instill the idea of liberty and freedom initially to five countries: Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria (Rearden, 2001: 707). On the other hand, the 
communist ideology was the main motivation behind the Soviet propaganda (Laswell 
1951: 72), in which “disinformation policies of the controlled media” were the main 
methods (Beichman 1984).  
As Bolsever states, the Soviet Union mainly implemented inside propaganda 
through the Communist Party about the “political, economical and cultural superiori-
ty of Soviet Socialism over Western Capitalim” (Bolsever, 1948: 177). On this issue, 
the mandatory teachings of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in higher education can be con-
sidered as one of the concrete evidences (Bolsever, 1948: 176). Yet, the Soviet Un-
ion also considered outside propaganda methods. Inkeles‟ research findings17 (1953) 
demonstrated that Soviet propaganda against Voice of America‟s broadcastings was 
                                                 
17
 Inkeles had conducted his research by evaluating more than seven thousand documentaries, which 
were broadcastings, newspapers and journals from the Soviet side.  
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generally on the flawed policies of the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. propaganda 
towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be regarded as an outside propa-
ganda method in which the main struggle occurred to win the outside public rather 
than the American public. 
RFE/RL, the unique radio stations, which is still broadcasting to a broad region of 
the world, had different purposes than of Voice of America (1942). The Voice of 
America was established to counter Japanese and Nazi propaganda (Jowett 2009: 
131). After all, the Voice of America is an “agent of U.S. government representing 
American culture and American foreign policy” (Urban, 1990: 42), whereas RFE/RL 
is a non-profit private corporation, funded by the United States. Into the bargain, 
during the Cold War era, the purpose of Voice of America was to introduce and 
highlight the American culture to overseas, whereas RFE/RL aimed to reveal the 
corruptions related to the counties specified above. 
The necessity of a separate radio station emerged in 1947-1948 (Cummings, 2008: 
169) during Truman Administration, as an initiative of “Campaign of Truth”. The 
idea was put into practice in 1950 by the creation of RFE and in 1953 by the creation 
of RL. The founding fathers of the radio stations were George Kennan, Allen Dulles 
and Frank Eisner whom aimed to create “unrest in Stalin‟s backyard” (Shattan, 2000: 
75)
18
. In 1976, the two corporations were merged together under the name of 
RFE/RL, Inc. in order to increase the effects of the propaganda. 
                                                 
18
 Review: “Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 
Arch Puddington, University Press of Kentucky, Reviewed by: Joseph Shattan “Freedom‟s Radio 
Stations”, The American Spectator, June 2000, pp.75-76 
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The effect of RFE/RL was based on its peculiar methods to transmit the “true” in-
formation by the émigrés, who suffered from communist ruling and fled to another 
country to survive. In the Appendix of Annual Report on RFE/RL Inc., the RFE/RL 
Professional Code of 1987 presents the aim behind the creation of RFE/RL as  fol-
lows (The Board For International Broadcasting 1990): 
Open communication of information and ideas among the peoples of the 
world not only constitutes a fundamental human right, but also contributes to 
international peace and stability. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are 
significant instruments in realizing the right to information and ideas across 
frontiers and in binding the human family together. The essence of RFE/RL‟s 
mission is the practice of independent, professional, and responsible broad-
cast journalism in order to provide uncensored news, information, and ideas 
to audiences whose governments systematically deny fundamental freedoms 
of communication and contact.  
 
Beside the use of strategic communication method through radio broadcastings, 
“leaflet droppings by balloons” were conducted during the Cold War initially from 
“West Germany to Czechoslovakia in 1951” (Cummings, 2010: 1). The U.S. used 
balloons to drop “leaflets, books and posters” (Cummings, 2008: 169) and the bal-
loon operation developed into a crisis in Soviet decision-making. The issue was 
brought on the United Nations based on the claim of an intrusion to the Soviet terri-
torial air space (Puddington, 2000: 71). Therefore, the impact of the balloon cam-
paign should not be underestimated. As Puddington states, the balloon campaign 
created revolt, demonstrations and boycotting in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hun-
gary (Puddington, 2000: 61), which automatically shows the power of the campaign. 
Beginning with the dropping of the propaganda materials, the history of RFE/RL has 
started. Although the main aim was to “tell the truth” to communist satellite states, in 
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some occasions RFE has exceeded its major goal and shifted to an anti-communist 
discourse. Due to the incompliance of the statements and the practices, especially J. 
William Fulbright opposed the very logic behind RFE. As an achievement, Fulbright 
was successful to cease the anti-communist provocative discourse in the broadcast-
ings (Shattan, 2000: 75). One of the prominent examples of vagueness in broadcast-
ing occurred during Hungarian revolt in which RFE/RL was “accused of encourag-
ing” the revolt via its broadcasting speeches (Martin, 1987: 850; Mickelson, 1978: 
574). Along these lines, for five months, “balloons dropped oppositional ballots and 
stickers” in Hungary (Granville, 2005: 818). Besides, RFE/RL was not broadcasting 
solely on political corruptions and valid information but also on entertainment pro-
grams and jazz music. Due to this reason, the effect of winning hearts and minds 
occurred not only with propaganda methods but also with public diplomacy. The aim 
of the entertainment programs was to show the lifestyle in America.  
The propaganda was effective, since the Soviet Union started jamming the frequency 
of RFE/RL, which was more “costly than transmitting” and “more difficult” to 
achieve (Brookhiser 1978: 332). As Krol (2001) stated, from the Soviet perspective, 
jamming was significant to stop the opposition in Soviet satellite states as well as to 
cease the information flow through the air.     
RFE/RL was a successful overt operation of the U.S. to win the hearts and minds of 
the communism driven publics. It was considered to be victorious in many countries, 
especially in Hungary. As Hixson affirmed, the Cold War was after all a struggle for 
the “hearts and minds”, a “psychological struggle for the support of world public 
opinion” (Hixson, 1997: 225; 233).  
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In addition, Robin has highlighted the Troy Project during the Cold War era, by the 
Department of State, with the collaboration of military and academic intellectuals, 
who attempted to change the discourse of “atomic analogy” more into a “battle for 
hearts and minds” by reducing the “antagonistic messages that might turn the au-
dience off” ( Robin, 2001: 45). In the final analysis the Cold War era was more re-
lated to public diplomacy, strategic communication, propaganda and psychological 
operations rather than military confrontation. The impact of the methods to win the 
hearts and minds can be considered as one of the main reasons for Soviet Union‟s 
demise. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MAJOR COMPONENTS OF WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS 
 
 
4.1 Conceptualization of Winning Hearts and Minds 
The foundation for the operationalization of the components of winning hearts and 
minds rests on the history of the concept, which is examined in previous chapters. 
Winning hearts and minds, for the remaining chapters of this thesis, will be regarded 
in relations to to domestic as well as foreign policies, with particular emphasis on 
terrorism and insurgency.  
The concept of winning hearts and minds relies primarily on the employment of soft 
power understanding. This understanding presumes that persuasion is at the core of 
the struggle. In this regard, Nye (2008: 96) evaluates the “soft power of a country” 
through three dimensions: “its culture, its political values and its foreign policy.” 
Adopting Nye‟s (2008) conceptualization on soft power, this part of the thesis focus-
es on the foreign policy aspect. In foreign policy, states employ the concept winning 
hearts and minds towards targeted population abroad through the proposed compo-
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nents. However, states do not regard those components together. Therefore, the deci-
sion-making fell short of success in the operationalization phase of winning hearts 
and minds. To distinguish the approach of this thesis from that of Nye (2008), do-
mestic policy tools of states towards their own population will also be evaluated 
within the cases studies.
19
  
 
4.2 Operationalization of Winning Hearts and Minds with regard to the Pro-
posed Components 
The concept winning hearts and minds can be understood in relation to its correspon-
dence with proposed components. These components would not work in harmony, if 
they are examined individually in foreign policy. That is to say, the framework of 
hearts and minds allows for certain terms to work in harmony. In thesis, the proposed 
terms comprising hearts and minds are: public diplomacy, strategic communication, 
psychological operations, propaganda and attitude and behavioral change and intelli-
gence. Figure 1 illustrates the components of the concept of winning hearts and 
minds: 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Nye‟s (2008) conceptualization of soft power assumes that states strengthen their soft power 
through public diplomacy. Nye‟s (2008) concept of public diplomacy is restricted within the frame-
work of foreign policy and omits policies directed at domestic population. 
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Figure 2. Components of Winning Hearts and Minds 
The former concepts are created by examining the necessities of foreign policy and 
are considered to be significant depending on the structure of the problems. In this 
regard, the components are used by decision makers and military personnel. In spite 
of that, the proposed components should not be separated from each other. Quite to 
the contrary, they are significantly related and considered as the parts of the sum, 
which is winning hearts and minds. Depending on the cases, states should determine 
the level of employing each component to their domestic and foreign policies. Since 
each case is unique, employing the components all together to every case would not 
be helpful. For instance, in the current case of Iraq strategic communication, propa-
ganda and attitude and behavior change would work more than in any other conflic-
tual places.  
The intervening states should constitute the requirements to win the hearts and minds 
by observing the population‟s desire and will to cooperate. Polls would be a good 
method to assess the targeted population‟s opinion. Moreover, to figure out which 
component would work better, states should rely on area studies. Even more than 
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area study knowing the culture and the societal needs would enable the states to 
create efficient policies.    
 
4.2.1 Public Diplomacy 
In traditional understanding diplomacy refers to the profession of managing interna-
tional relations, typically by country‟s representatives abroad, that is diplomats. In 
that context, the term diplomacy becomes highly associated with the skills of go-
vernmental representatives concerning state to state relationships (see Broderick 
1924). However, public diplomacy is beyond traditionally understood diplomacy.  It 
is not a solemn tool of states but also “non-state actors” in their approach to foreign 
public (Center on Diplomacy Research Group, 2010). Cull (2008a: 32) identifies 
public diplomacy components within five categories: “listening, advocacy, cultural 
diplomacy, exchange and broadcasting agencies.”20 Cull (2008a) judges the effec-
tiveness of foreign policy through the assessment of whether a state has employed 
the components accurately. On the other hand, taking the argument of Leonard 
(2002, as cited by Nye, 2008: 102) there are three dimensions of public diplomacy, 
which embrace “daily communication, strategic communication and cultural diplo-
macy.” This thesis deviates from Leonard‟s (2002) dimensions on public diplomacy, 
since strategic communications does not regarded as a branch of public diplomacy. 
That is, the strategic communication and public diplomacy are components of equal 
value to each other, rather than constituting one dimension. In addition to the above 
                                                 
20
 For an extensive analysis of public diplomacy see Cull (2008b). 
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view, strategic communication is a new term. The scholars of strategic communica-
tion consider the concept as separate from public diplomacy as well. In this respect, 
Cull (2008a) applies one part of public diplomacy through the employment of “cul-
tural exchange” policies. As an example, the exchange of students21 through Ful-
bright scholarship as well as scholars and artist exchanges are all regarded as cultural 
exchange. Cultural exchange needs long-term commitment. Therefore, it would not 
be a short term response policy for states during an intervention to another state‟s 
territory. For that reason, in definition, public diplomacy encompasses a broader pub-
lic domain.  
In consideration of the above, a historical example would bring the reader to under-
stand better of public diplomacy. Barghoorn‟s article (1958: 44-45) provides for such 
an account as he analyzed Soviet Union‟s cultural diplomacy during Cold War. Ac-
cording to Barghoorn (1958), Soviet Union‟s public diplomacy relied essentially on 
cultural exchanges and on the promotion of the image of Soviet Union under the title 
of “center of progress, enlightenment, and humanitarianism.” This observation intro-
duces a notion that one of the major aims of public diplomacy is to create a credible 
image
22
 on the foreign public, through which hearts and minds could be achieved 
most effortlessly. On this issue, a concrete example would be the establishment of 
                                                 
21
 Janowitz (1961) has compared the cultural diplomacy of the U.S. to the Soviet Union concerning 
the years 1958-1959 with regard to exchange students. “43.000 foreign students came to the U.S. and 
12.000 Americans studied outside” whereas “the Soviet Union hosted 17.000 foreign students.”   
22
 In a policy prescript article Finn (2003) gave five methods to create a better image: encouraging 
foreign educational reforms, extending existing foreign exchange programs, improving the access of 
foreign publics to American institutions and values, encouraging better cross-cultural understanding at 
home; and revitalizing volunteerism abroad”. The prescription on the article is directed to the Ameri-
can interest; however it can be generalized under public diplomacy efforts.   
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U.S. presence with three hundred thousand Americans in Europe after World War II. 
The U.S. has aimed to assure the European public that not only European but also 
American citizens would be endangered by Soviet Union‟s proximity. This example 
indicates that words should comply with the deeds. This represents the fact that one 
of the aims of public diplomacy is to present the foreign audience that the credibility 
of the state‟s policies depend on the compliance of words with actions. 
The U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been diverted to a new phase after September 
11. The statements of George W. Bush, the former President of the U.S., embraced 
much of ambiguousness in meaning. In his speech on September 16, 2001 George 
W. Bush stated that “this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while” 
(Bush, September 16, 2001).  The word crusade was misleading in his speech, since 
the targeted audience cannot be clearly identified. This resulted in condemnation of 
West by the public of the Muslim world, both radical and moderate Muslims. The 
speech‟s metaphor was interpreted as hostile, based on its historical precedent. After 
such an incident, the need to rely on public diplomacy was more than a necessity.
23
 
This leads to a conclusion that public diplomacy would operate well by choosing 
right and direct words to the foreign public with accurate reference to the receiver.  
                                                 
23
 At the end of September 2001, Bush created the term Operation Enduring Freedom, which is gener-
ally referred to the activities of the U.S. The operation in Iraq has the same name as “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom”. Even in the U.S. military base in Baghdad, they are using tickets (in correspondence to 
money), which has Iraqi children on one side and on the former side of the tickets.  Such labeling 
lacks the understanding of what it could have meant to a foreigner? (This is a personal observation, 
after staying in an American compound in Iraq for ten days.)  In this regard, public diplomacy means 
choosing right words and symbols.   
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4.2.2 Strategic Communication 
Before discussing strategic communication, a clarification on the definition of au-
dience, which is the core of literature on strategic communication, is needed. The 
definition of audience is a “group of people who have gathered together to hear or 
watch somebody/something” (Cowie, 1989: 66). Therefore, the audience can only 
hear and listen as if they are obliged to. The audience is supposed to be open to any 
communication by definition in such a way that audience is merely there to listen. 
After reviewing the literature both in terms of message influence model and accept-
ing a more complex model of Corman
24
 et al. (2007), there appears to be a minor 
misconception in the use of the word audience that needs clarification by employing 
another word as the existing literature lacks in the complementary word to describe 
the public who can manage to change the course of an event.  
Let‟s assume an audience in a theater to understand the gap in strategic communica-
tion literature in searching for a suitable term. In a certain play the audience would 
get a direct message from the players. Yet they cannot change the course of the play. 
Therefore, a play reflects a unilateral action. The term play is the equivalent form of 
policies of an intervening state during an intervention. In this instance, the audience 
represents the intended public that can be manipulated either in positive or negative 
manner. Yet, communication is a two-way channel, since public can also affect the 
performance of the players.  
                                                 
24
 Steven Corman is a Professor at Arizona State University, who has his specialization on Strategic 
Communication. 
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In the context of communication, the public actually involves in the case through 
their beliefs and judgments. Thus, a proposed term, participatory audience, is devel-
oped on the search of this thesis. Based upon the advice of Corman
25
 (2010), the 
word participant is chosen rather than audience per se. Because of the stated reason, 
the term audience conceptualizes and defines participatory public, who have the 
ability and capability to change the course of an action.   
Taking into consideration above definition of the audience, strategic communication 
remains blurry in terms of meaning. The United States, officially, has not defined the 
meaning of strategic communication, yet. However, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
Gordon England, proposes a definition to improve the efficiency of Department of 
Defense (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2006: 3) as follows: 
Focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and 
engage key audiences [emphasize is added] to create, strengthen, or preserve 
conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the 
use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchro-
nized with other elements of national power. 
 
The proposed definition of strategic communication highlights the main difference 
between strategic communication and public diplomacy by stating the key audiences 
as the reference. Brigadier General Mari K. Eder (2007: 63) clarifies the intention of 
strategic communication by stressing the magnitude of “specific audience”, since it 
serves for “specific purpose”. Contrary, in public diplomacy the recipient would be 
vaguer, since the message is not delivered to specific masses but to a broad public. 
                                                 
25
 Personal discussion with Corman at the conference Global Terrorism and International Cooperation 
III held by Center of Excellence Defense against Terrorism in March 15-16, 2010. 
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Yet, the definition poses instruments to have an effective strategic communication 
system. These instruments are public affairs, public diplomacy, military diplomacy 
and information operations, and psychological operations (Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, 2006: 2). The Department of Defense has named the above terms as “primary 
supporting capabilities” of strategic communication (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
2006: 5). 
Since strategic communication is a fairly new concept, scholars define its scope and 
instruments in distinct ways. Colonel William M. Darley (2008: 2) presents an exten-
sive scope of the concept. He emphasizes the word strategic, and explores the word 
in regard to winning hearts and minds and communication. Darley (2008) shapes the 
scope of strategic communication as an “event-driven process”. According to him, 
during the course of events, the style of the communication and the instruments be-
come totally apparent. Since public diplomacy and public affairs are defined in ad-
vance (Darley, 2008: 4), observation and assessment of certain situations profoundly 
during the event is a hard task to accomplish.  
Strategic communication does not imply only words but also deeds, so that words 
would comply with actions. Cable‟s (1993) observation on “the old cliché, „actions 
speak louder than words‟” is not always true. Cable assumes that through psycholog-
ical operations governments can achieve the “perceived legitimacy” (Cable, 1993: 
258). However, actions do count in strategic studies. It is the Department of Defense 
and military cadre that decide on the scope and choice of response.  
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According to Murphy (2008: 3), military operations are at the core of strategic com-
munication in terms of sending apparent messages. In this manner, Murphy (2008: 3) 
states that strategic communication can be seen as a tool for deception to convince 
the population by sending messages such as media coverage and rumors. On con-
trary, deception can lead the public to the adversary, which can result by the loss of 
public support. On this point, Admiral James Stavridis (2007) offers a set of commu-
nication guidelines. According to Stavridis (2007: 5), the main concern should be 
given to tell the truth to the audience. In the author‟s conceptualization of communi-
cation systems, lie eventually appears somewhere in some time. Thus when it 
emerges it will decrease the credit of decision makers. 
To grasp the roots of strategic communication, Shannon-Weaver model (1949) on 
the basics of “information theory” (U.S. Congress, September 1995: 77) should be 
identified. The so called traditional message influence model is developed by Shan-
non and Weaver (1949), where Shannon had evaluated the mathematical logic of 
information, whereas Weaver examined the “general theory of communication” 
(Burks, 1951: 3). Through Shannon‟s (1949:1) assessment communication is com-
plex since it is not related only to send the message but also observing the outcome 
of the message. The Shannon‟s diagram (1949: 2) on communication system has the 
similar logic with strategic communication.  
Shannon-Waever‟s communication diagram shows the transmission of a message 
from the “source” and the channels it passes through to reach the receiver. This mod-
el generally assumes telephony, telegraphy, radio and television as the instruments to 
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send the message. Beside the proposed logic, noise is shown as an intervening source 
that influences and alters the outcome.   
As Corman et al. (2007) discuss, although the traditional model of Shannon-Weaver 
describes the basic logic of telephony, strategic communication‟s form has changed 
through communication theory. Corman et al. (2007) observed the value of informa-
tion, after moving from different channels. Corman et al. (2007: 3-9) examine mes-
sage sending in communication systems in terms of the sender and the receiver. Ac-
cording to them, when the old “message influence model” is transformed to social 
sciences, it may not take into consideration the complexity of message sending. 
Moreover, it may avoid the beliefs and attitudes of the audience. The Naval Officer 
and Public Spokesman in Iraq, Steve Tatham
26
 (2009) shares similar concerns as 
Corman et al. do. Tatham (2009) names the drawbacks of message influencing model 
by stating that it is a “simplistic way of communication” in which outside interfe-
rence and audiences‟ conditions are not taken into consideration. Tatham (2009) 
points out the necessity of pragmatic complexity model of Corman et al. (2007), stat-
ing that the audience has its own values and beliefs that are subjected to sender‟s 
“behavior” and receiver‟s “expectations” (Tatham, 2009: 19-20). Therefore, in a 
complex environment, strategic communicators should assume at least two important 
factors that can penetrate into the message: (1) too much noise surrounding the mes-
sage. (2) The audience might have its own beliefs, prejudices and a posture to the 
actions. 
                                                 
26
 To have further information on Tatham visit his website: 
    http://web.mac.com/statham/iWeb/Site%202/Home.html 
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Too much noise refers to circumstances in which there are too many messages sur-
rounding the population that cause hesitation to choose or believe one or the other. 
When there is too much noise, the message that communicators send can change in a 
negative way or in a way that is not intended. In this paradigm there are two draw-
backs. The first is the hardness to control the outer information, since there will be 
too much information circumnavigating the targeted population. The second is the 
assumption that terrorists/insurgents may attempt to persuade the public to support 
their cause to fight. For this reason, the insurgents/terrorists may convert the message 
or create a new message that contradicts the ideas of the government and/or the in-
tervening state. The latter case generally occurs in insurgency led conditions. Too 
much information has also an effect on the decision-making process. It can lead the 
decision-makers to a psychological trap, which is known in literature as cognitive 
dissonance.
27
 
In the workshop of Centre of Excellence Defense against Terrorism, Steven Corman 
(2009) suggested a new parameter, concerning the usefulness of too much noise sur-
rounding the environment. He defends that message controlling is insufficient, since 
the noise will be constant. For that reason, decision makers should benefit from other 
messages within the environment. According to Corman (2009), no message can be 
considered as the “best message,” yet an optimal one would serve well than seek for 
                                                 
27
 In the part Attitude and Behavioral Change, cognitive dissonance will be examined in a deep man-
ner. However, since all five concepts are highly interlinked to each other, one cannot dismiss the rela-
tion between strategic communication and attitude-behavior change. Once the aim of strategic com-
munication is to create an attitude/behavioral change, it can be said that strategic communication is a 
mean to establish a new form of ideas on the targeted population. Therefore, attitude and behavior 
change becomes the end in itself. On the other hand, in the broad form attitude-behavior change is 
also becomes a tool to win hearts and minds of the population.   
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a perfect message. Since “messages will be interacting no matter what we do” the 
decision-makers should find an exit point to turn the situation to their own benefit. 
Transferring the aggregated messages into a beneficial stage, Corman (2009) propos-
es to rely on random variation and experimentation. This proposal accounts for “con-
tingency planning.”  
Apart from the noise surrounding the environment, the audience also should not be 
seen as a recipient of all the information upon which a judgment is made. Such in-
stance can be defended in Shannon-Waever model (as cited in Corman et. al. 2007: 
4) in which right before the destination of a message, there is the receiver that gets 
both the received signal and the noise surrounding the environment. In Shannon- 
Weaver‟s model (1949), the problem can be solved by eradicating the noise, relying 
on technical methods. However, when it is applied to social sciences, it fails since the 
object is human beings whom have internal beliefs and experiences. Therefore, an 
essentially mechanical model lacks the understanding of the audience‟s own beliefs 
and attitudes. In Military Review, Robert Deutsch (2007: 124), who is a cognitive 
anthropologist and communications consultant, states that “foreign audiences have 
emotions more complex than the electrical circuitry in modern munitions.” 
Scholars from psychology affirm that in actual life it is hard to eradicate an existent 
belief of a population, since human beings do not like instable environments. Accept-
ing or rejecting an idea can be considered as a change for a short time. Yet, it would 
lead to a general change of belief system afterwards. Apart from that, human beings 
cannot cope with a chaotic environment. As a result, they are eager to solve the prob-
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lem with a rapid move. On the methods to cope with terrorism, the former is likely to 
be observed as a hard task to manage. 
Apart from audience‟s own beliefs, at the first level the sender needs an audience that 
the message will be received. Zalman (2009: 88), a Ph.D. candidate, put this as 
“every story requires both a teller and a listener in order to be complete.” If one has a 
story to tell but does not have an audience then the story would not be worth. Yet, 
one should produce an exciting story that will achieve the enthusiasm of the partici-
patory audience.  
The asymmetric nature represents a challenge to the context of terrorism/insurgency. 
The audience is out there. However, manipulation of the audience becomes an issue 
of sensitivity, since the participatory audience has their own world. Interference of 
counter-terrorism units to that realm of reality would recoil every action that is 
achieved formerly. Strategic communication is a method to minimize the negativism 
on the actions of the third power or the existing government in a given country. 
However, strategic communication is a double sided sharp knife that can cut off the 
interferer‟s attempts, as it is discussed above. To strengthen the implementation of 
strategic communication, the interferer should notice the very basics of communica-
tion. In this regard, linguistic is at the core of this process. In a case in which the 
countering unit is not familiar with the language of the targeted population, the units 
risk a danger of falling into the trap of sending wrong messages. To diminish this 
risk, the counter terrorism units work with interpreters. Even much harder is that 
these experts should also know the culture and the cultural norms to assess the mes-
sage. Besides, strategic communication alone may not be adequate to win hearts and 
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minds of the targeted audience. Accordingly the harmony of all the components 
would be more efficient. Yet, strategists, strategic consultants and academicians 
should bear in mind that manipulating the population to their end would not create a 
stabile and peaceful environment, where all population benefits. 
 
4.2.3 Intelligence 
The role of intelligence is to capture and assess information. According to Elworthy 
(2005: 1), intelligence is necessary to know the whereabouts of certain individuals, to 
curtail the supplies of weapons, to stop the flow of money transfer and to understand 
the terrorist mind. Intelligence is a part of winning hearts and minds as it assesses 
whether the local population is on the side of the government or pro to the insurgent 
cause. As Kahn (2006: 134) underlines, “information cannot win wars by itself”. It 
can help to prevent a terrorist attack in advance or it can lead the decision makers to 
understand the targeted populations will. Besides, intelligence can be helpful to track 
terrorists via enormous changes of bank accounts. Moreover, internet is another 
realm that information flows to intended people to conduct an attack. To prevent an 
attack beforehand, the information on internet should be assessed by the experts of 
intelligence as well (see Jacobson, 2010: 353). Thus, intelligence takes the role of 
checking and controlling systems. Insurgents can achieve support and assistance to 
their cause by winning the hearts and minds of the population. Tackling this support 
by leaving the insurgents alone can be achievable by intelligence gathering. In insur-
gency based struggles, if the intervening state can win the hearts and minds of the 
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population, they can easily acquire intelligence about the specific places where in-
surgents stays. Besides, intelligence can lack the supporters help to the insurgents.   
Intelligence gathering is not an easy task. The validity of the information should al-
ways be questioned. It is the duty of specialists to assess which information is rele-
vant. As Ronczkowski (2004: 74) stresses, specialists should be well trained and 
know what they seek and “how to portray the details”. The aim of the specialists is to 
create a database on the relevant information and to assess it carefully (Ronczkowski, 
2004: 74). 
In countering terrorism, intelligence can work in different ways. A reported false 
identification card or a stolen passport can be the base of gathering intelligence on a 
terrorist organization. Population is a useful intelligence system as well. When intel-
ligence is gathered from citizens, it is named as human intelligence (Humint) and it is 
a part of community intelligence. Innes (2006: 231) states community intelligence as 
follow: “Community intelligence is one way in which police can obtain some under-
standing of any tensions that might be exacerbated following a terrorist incident.” 
According to Innes (2006: 230), “community intelligence applied to counterterror-
ism” and assists the police to fill the “gaps” of their “methods.” It is a method to 
achieve the “community view” (Innes, 2006: 234). Neighbor policing is a method of 
intelligence gathering, which is conducted by police officers (to have further view on 
neighbor policing see Innes 2006). This intelligence gathering system is associated 
with community policing as well. Besides, Murray (2005: 348) pointed out to a fun-
damental difference between traditional policing and community policing. As he 
stated, traditional policing is reactionary and it separates public from the police; whe-
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reas community policing entails the integration of police forces within the public to 
achieve intelligence.  
 
4.2.4 Attitude and Behavioral Change 
To achieve support from the population, governmental forces should know how to 
change attitude and/or the behavior of the population. In this respect, one of the other 
components of winning hearts and minds is to alter the human thinking and acting. In 
this regard, Wolf (1965:14) underestimates the significance of winning hearts and 
minds, finds the concept as unrealistic, “broad, and an ambitious term” due to the 
“social transformation solutions” that it tackles. He is in favor of behavioral change 
rather than attitude change. In support to the argument of Wolf, Lilja (2009: 308-
310) also advocates behavioral change, which shapes “passive neutral cooperation to 
silence, to the offering of food, shelter, information and finances.” 
To go further, Rokeach (2001: 530) defines attitude change as the “change in the 
organization or structure of beliefs or a change in the content of one or more of the 
beliefs entering into the attitude organization.” According to Rokeack the attitude of 
a person determines the behavior. Besides, behavior operates with the combination of 
two kinds of attitudes: attitude-toward-object and attitude-toward-situation. The latter 
presents an attitude change in a certain situation; whereas the former illustrates an 
attitude change in reference to an object, which can be witnessed only if a situation 
occurs (Rokeach, 2001: 532). 
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Nevertheless, people hold strong personal beliefs and are inclined to preserve them to 
seek for a “positive outcome” of the behavior (Hartman, 2008: 6). Therefore, beha-
vioral change is also a challenging task to manage. To change the behavior of the 
population, Wolf (1965) states the significant role of improving life standards, social 
and economic conditions of the population. When and if the former conditions 
change then the behavior of the population to the interferer would also change is the 
main logic of Wolf‟s (1965) argument. 
On contrary, behavior change can also occur in the opposite direction, beneficial to 
the insurgent by enforcing the driving motive of fear. In this set of questioning, be-
havior alters as a consequence of fear and “anxiety about an attack” (Goodwin et al. 
2005: 393). Yet, consistency theorists (Jowett and O‟Donnell, 2005: 172) pose a dis-
tinct understanding on the behavior, stating that consistency is the main aim of the 
population in which the population desires for consistency in cognitive level. There-
fore, seek for consistency would limit the aim to shape the attitude and behavior of 
the population. 
Although behavior change is easier and less time consuming than attitude change, in 
the long-run, attitude change is more reliable. If attitude change occurs in regard to 
the alteration of ideology and beliefs during a conflicting timeframe, it will last long-
er. In such an instance, the population will reject the new messages due to the desire 
for consistency that come into prominence. Yet, attitude change is a long process. It 
is highly unlikely to change the attitudes in countering terrorism/insurgency within a 
short period. 
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According to the psychiatrist Abdulkadir Çevik (2009: 6), attitude and behavior 
change relies on the perception of the intervened society. As said by Çevik, “percep-
tion management” is the clue to get the population. Moreover, according to him, to 
change the perceptions, the intervener should fulfill the “expectations of the public.” 
19
th
 century poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (1852) also supports the view on perception 
with regard to the mind, on his work A Defense of Poetry. The poet stated that: “all 
things exist as they are perceived; at least in relation to the percipient. „The mind is 
its own place, and of itself can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven‟” (Shelley, 
1852: 44).  Adding Çevik‟s view (2009) to the 19th century poetic philosophy, it may 
be concluded that the change of attitude or behavior is more related to the mind-set 
of the society rather than pure emotional feelings.  
To summarize, as it is discussed, some scholars are in favor of behavioral change, 
whereas others support attitude change. The behavioral change is a short term policy; 
whereas attitude change is a long term process and needs patience. In this regard, 
from the stance of the population, cutting the assistance to insurgents/terrorists may 
be regarded as a behavioral change. On the other hand, cutting the view to support 
terrorist organizations‟ ideological views can be considered as an attitude change.   
4.2.5 Propaganda and Psychological Warfare 
According to Payne (2009: 111), propaganda is the “attempt to persuade the public 
through the communication narrative” that the propagandist‟s particular idea is just. 
In addition, propaganda differs from normal communication since the former relies 
on “memory” and perception (Payne, 2009:111). In daily communication, the reality 
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is presented through facts; whereas in propaganda the interferer can change or con-
vert the facts to the desired shape. 
Literature shows that there are three different kinds of propaganda, named black, 
grey and white propaganda. Becker (1949: 221-235) defined black propaganda in 
terms of “rumors”, “gossip”, “slogans” and “leaflets” on which the control is difficult 
to handle, since black propaganda spreads without the will of the creator in any di-
rection and in any other form. To give an example of black propaganda, with refer-
ence to Mein Kampf (as cited in Eayrs, 1951/1952: 37), Hitler stated the description 
of a “big lie” essential to understand the impact of black propaganda as follows:  
The great masses…with the primitive simplicity of their minds… will more 
easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one, since they themselves 
perhaps also lie in small things, but would certainly be ashamed to lie in big 
things. Thus such an untruth will not at all enter their heads, and therefore 
they will be unable to believe in the possibility of the enormous impudence of 
the most infamous distortion of others… therefore, just for this reason some 
part of the most impudent lie will remain and stick.”  
 
Hitler regarded lie as a mean in politics and war. In this respect, as Eayrs stated, Hit-
ler is more inclined to black propaganda, which the Soviet Union also utilized in 
Eastern Europe. The great realists of the history such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu 
would also be considered to be black propagandist, if they have lived in contempo-
rary era, since their conceptualization of propaganda is based on deception.  
According to Gordon Simpsons (1999: 98), who is a military police officer in Cana-
dian Defense Forces, psychological operations and propaganda are significant to per-
suade the civilians on the usefulness of government structures and services. Refer-
ring to the above statement, in his work, Davison (1971) shows the “trends” in prop-
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aganda by looking at its history. By the start of World War I, allied powers used 
propaganda by dropping “leaflets and posters” to affect the moral of the opponent to 
fight. Yet, major propaganda in World War I was conducted within the framework of 
“domestic morale” with the exception of “leaflet and pamphlets” droppings into the 
fighting fronts (Eayrs, 1951-1952: 36). In World War II, as Davison (1971) framed, 
the U.S. used propaganda by “infiltrating agents to the enemy lines” to achieve in-
formation and to spread news via “rumors.” Throughout and after the world wars, 
decision-makers had comprehended the significance of the population. After all, as 
the Davison claimed even in the life of Alexander the Great, propaganda can be visi-
ble. Major evidence to his argument is based on the “public relations advisors” and 
historians of Alexander the Great. According to Davison (1971), Alexander the Great 
had asked to have historians nearby through his conquests in the aim of creating a 
credible history of his campaigns and of notifying the Macedonian public about his 
accomplishments, so to get the public support.  
The programs of propaganda can be successful via the practice of strategic commu-
nication. Yet, both in propaganda and in strategic communication, storytelling is sig-
nificant. After 2001, the term narrative steps into the literature as a method to win 
hearts and minds. The logic behind the narrative is to tell a story to the foreign au-
dience and expect their response to the stories. Due to this former reason, the story as 
well as the interpretation of the story in terms of propagandist discourse is vital. 
Propaganda can be utilized to change the behavior of the population. Yet, propagan-
da is not an end in itself; rather it serves for winning hearts and minds through which 
the decision makers can employ. 
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As Payne (2009: 110) evaluates, programs of propaganda are generally “deception, 
manipulation and outright lying.” This negative connotation erodes when persuasion, 
the use of media and leaflet dropping are linked as a program of propaganda as well. 
Leaflets are helpful to conduct a successful operation under the method of psycho-
logical operations and propaganda. In this framework, during Gulf War leaflets were 
used to convince the Iraqi soldiers to abandon the will to fight (Hickey, 2001: 1). 
Words can also be a form of propaganda. For instance former President George 
Bush‟s famous declaration of “axis of evil”28 (Bush, January 29, 2002) can be consi-
dered as a propagandist discourse to get the world on the side of the U.S. However, it 
had a negative effect. Likewise, Bush‟s speech on “you are either with us or against 
us”29 (CNN November 6, 2001), is another propagandist discourse to force the inter-
national arena to choose side.  
 
4.3 The Examination of the Proposed Components with respect to Response 
Policy of States 
The components of winning hearts and minds are shaped through the response phase 
of states in relation to their foreign policy actions towards the population. In the book 
                                                 
28
 The declaration on the axis of evil by the former president George W. Bush is: “States like these, 
and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seek-
ing weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide 
these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or 
attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be cata-
strophic.” 
29
 The declaration on the stated sentence is: “Over time it's going to be important for nations to know 
they will be held accountable for inactivity," he said. "You're either with us or against us in the fight 
against terror.” 
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The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, Ganor (2005) points out the necessity of a definition 
of terrorism. The author questions the effectiveness of state responses in an era 
where scholars, decision-makers and specialists cannot agree on the definition. The 
response of states generally differs from each other. Yet, it is generally admitted that 
“intimidation and/or “coercing a government” (U.S. Department of State 2004; FBI) 
is the major motive under terrorism. Due to the gap upon an international definition 
of terrorism, countering mechanisms are inadequate to address the remedy of terror-
ism/insurgency. Although states try to cooperate under the umbrella to fight against 
terrorism, figuring out a conduct of unified action is arduous. In this sense, the con-
cept of winning hearts and minds as a genuine act would be valuable to counter a 
terrorist action even if there is no consensus on the definition internationally.    
The components above are associated with minimum use of force during a conflict. 
The case studies presented in Chapter V are highly related to the response of states 
and components that they implement during a conflict. Therefore, without evaluating 
the foreign policy methods, the chapter would not be accomplished in full manner.   
The dilemma on the response level is a factor dealing with terrorism. In the realist 
agenda states are regarded as rational actors on decision making. However, a crisis 
could force the decision-makers to respond without questioning the adequacy of the 
action. The result could be a disaster, since the planning phase of response is short-
ened. Following this statement, states that counter terrorism should grasp the aspects 
of response. Besides, they should organize their policy structures on variety of di-
mensions, before responding. To bear in mind, response does not only qualify the 
countering strategy to a terrorist organization or the hub state; but also qualifies the 
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approval of the public as well as the international actors. This process renders the 
response phase a fragile process.  
During the response, states can adopt hard line policies as well as soft line policies to 
transform the environment on behalf of the state cause. McCormick (2003) evaluates 
the theoretical approaches in terrorism with regards to terrorist organizations, under 
rational, organizational and psychological model. He stresses the expecting result of 
a terrorist organization after an attack is conducted. According to McCormick a ter-
rorist organization “hope” to achieve the “targeted audience(s) respond in a way that 
advances group interests” (McCormick, 2003: 483). This shows that terrorist organi-
zations inflict states to have rapid response in return to terrorists attacks to strengthen 
the latter‟s cause on the intended population. In this regard, states can fall into two 
kinds of trap. First of all, if states use disproportionate counter terrorism measures 
that can affect not only the terrorist groups but also the citizens, they may not suc-
ceed in attaining the intended public support. Secondly, if states rely solely on soft-
line methods to counter terrorism, they can practice pressure from their own public, 
since citizens will demand total security. Therefore, the response has duplicities and 
none of the two branches meet the criteria to conduct an effective campaign. An ef-
fective campaign should consider two primary questions: How to respond? What 
would be the anticipated result from that respond? 
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4.3.1 How to Respond: Minimum Use of Force 
When examining British response to insurgencies from 1919 to 1960, Mockaitis 
(1990: 63) states that minimum use of force should be the logic of countering insur-
gency. However, as the author also poses, minimum use of force fall short of suc-
cess, if states do not employ a robust intelligence system. According to this logic, a 
proper intelligence should locate the places of insurgents, their sanctuaries, their 
communication systems etc. In general, minimum use of force should be the first 
principle to counter insurgency. Yet, in countering international terrorism locating 
terrorists is a hard job to do.  
Terrorist organizations aim to achieve a response from states to hit back, hard. Most 
states fail into this trap with the aim to represent the invulnerability and power of the 
state structure.  In this regard, Iraqi grievances pioneered by the United States or hard 
campaigns of Spanish government towards ETA were similar in terms of response. 
These examples show that rapid response with major flows would instill problems 
for the state to persuade the intended public to support their argument. Therefore, 
response should be planned carefully. Hard measures on the targeted population 
would cause more damage than intended. 
 
4.3.2 How to Respond: Military-Police Relations during Response 
Essentially the lack of civil-military harmony creates immense problems in the oper-
ational phase of response. The job description of police forces from soldiers, differ 
majorly, which curtails the efficiency of timely response. Taking into account the 
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former stance, major aim of a soldier is to find and if necessary shoot the opponent 
forces; whereas polices‟ duty is to control violence inside the society. Cooperation 
and collaboration between the two forces is critical to win the hearts and minds of the 
population. The network within the police forces can provide required information 
about the insurgents. As long as police unit has the information, it can share with the 
military (Mockaitis, 1990: 69). In practice the creation of “joint commanders” can be 
beneficial between the military and police to have efficiency throughout the opera-
tions. 
When and if police units are perceived as a hostile institution from the perspective of 
a population, winning hearts and minds approach should prevail on the purpose of 
fixing the reputation of the police. In the case of Malayan Emergency, police units 
had reestablished this reputation by broadening their job description to help people in 
need (see Chapter V). Therefore, although radicals of a group are responsible for an 
action, with the selected response tactic the state can either succeed or fail. The latter 
generally concludes by collateral damages.  
4.3.3 How to Respond: Hard Means (Contemporary Counter Argument) 
On contrary to the positive responses on winning hearts and minds in Operations 
Other Than Wars, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade (1996) present a counter 
argument with a term named “shock and awe” by employing rapid dominance. Their 
work provides insights in countering the contemporary logic on winning hearts and 
minds in respect of the response phase. The authors defend the view that adversary 
should be countered by rapid, timely actions, and by dominating the public percep-
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tion and values and transforming them into the U.S. intend. The work cannot be ge-
neralized to each and every country, since for shock and awe the intervened state 
should have the power and capability to change the course of a war by military 
means. 
Ullman and Wade (1996: 25) discuss that “massive bombardment” to cities, public, 
or command and control system of the opponent, the U.S. can achieve its main aim, 
which is to create exhaustion on the intended public and break its will to fight.  To 
achieve such an end “deception, misinformation, guile” are the methods. However, 
main driving motives should be to create “pain and shock” on the society and on the 
decision-makers cadre (Ullman and Wade, 1996: 25). This aim would generate a 
societal breakdown; in addition through the destruction of military facilities the op-
ponent would renounce upon resisting (Ullman and Wade, 1996:  30-32).  
Ullman and Wade (1996) support the above argument with historical cases. One of 
the cases is the dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the purpose of 
ceasing resistance by changing people‟s perception and attitude. The authors defend 
the view that devastation by nuclear bombs to alter society‟s attitude and perception 
is more effortless than by conventional weapons. The logic within the assumption of 
the authors relies on the use of hard means. The main idea that the authors refer to is 
to attack strategically important site, command and control systems, direct military 
compound, or the population to “control the subset of enemy‟s perception” (Ullman 
and Wade, 1996: 83). 
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However, the logic behind the argument lacks in certain contemporary cases since 
hard means would not bring success in itself. Gaza War from December 2008 to Jan-
uary 2009 cannot be considered as a successful initiative on the part of Israel.  It 
lacked the hopes for rapprochement, ended with immense number of death toll, and 
the condemnation of the world. Can Israel be regarded as a regional hegemonic pow-
er comparing to the U.S.? The logical response to this question relies on Israel‟s 
power of conventional and probable nuclear capabilities in the region. Besides, after 
its establishment, Israel kindly dominated the Arab world by indicating its military 
capability. After Gaza War, due to the creation of new perceptions on the new gener-
ation, it is significantly impossible to win the hearts and minds of the Palestinians. 
This new generation may remember the tragic events, might have lost their parents 
and may grow up with tragic stories. Thus, particular to this case, “how would Israel 
change the perception of those who are once strike by massive bombardment?” is the 
crucial question to direct on Ullman and Wade‟s argument.  
 
 
 66 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 
This chapter examines four case studies under two frameworks. It evaluates the as-
sumption that winning hearts and minds and its components are necessary in fighting 
against terrorism and insurgency. The first set of case study composes of Vietnam 
War and Malayan Emergency (1940s-1960s). These cases are examined with com-
parative case study method in terms of examining the components of winning hearts 
and minds. The second set of case studies is composed of Madrid and London Bomb-
ings (2004-2005) in which Al-Qaeda is the perpetrator. This group of cases aims to 
show the difference of domestic policies in terms of response.  
The cases show two different form of practice during the employment of the pro-
posed components of the concept. The Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency dem-
onstrate outside party involvement to another state‟s territory in which the intervened 
government cannot be able to rule itself. London and Madrid Bombings reveal coun-
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ter terrorism responses of governments inside their own territory in which govern-
ments conduct domestic policies to win its citizens, who are Muslim in origin. 
 
5.1 Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War 
 
5.1.1 Malayan Emergency 
The Malayan Emergency that took place from 1948-1960 can be seen as a successful 
counter-insurgency campaign. It was carried by British authorities against Commun-
ist Chinese insurgents, who were in favor of Mao‟s communist ideology. At the be-
ginning of the struggle, British forces were unorganized and came to the brick of 
defeat. However, Britain had a valuable campaign. According to Cable (1993), Brit-
ain‟s success had relied on the “single ethno-linguistic minority” that they faced in 
Malaya. Since the struggle was based on minority dissatisfaction, it was handled eas-
ily (Cable, 1993: 238). The decisive actions of British authorities, which were led by 
the leadership of General Briggs and by General Sir Gerald Templer, change the very 
course of the insurgency.
30
 
                                                 
30
 According to the impact of General Templer on the course of insurgency, there are two contradict-
ing historiography. The revisionist/Communist view argues that Templer‟s era was the continuity of 
improvement and it was not a break-through of the conflict by emphasizing the role of Briggs Plan, 
before Templer‟s arrival. The traditional/Anglo Saxon view puts the emphasis on Templer‟s successes 
and the drastic change after his arrival. This part of the thesis defends the revisionist view by showing 
the flows of the traditionalist standing. To have an overall conceptualization of the contradiction see 
Karl Hack and Kumar Ramakrishna.  
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5.1.1.1 Historical Overview of Malayan Emergency 
Malaya was not a “united” nation state, but it was a “Federation that had nine semi-
autonomous states” (Mockaitis, 1990: 112). In June 1948, Malayan Government de-
clared “State of Emergency”, since violence had spread after the “killing of European 
planters and the attacks to police, and government” (Gregorian, 1994: 343). Chinese 
insurgents had their expertise in the jungle and it was hard to defeat them with pure 
military power. They were considered to be minority. Yet, 38% of the population 
was Chinese (Sunderland, 1964: v). An initial attempt to drive insurgents back was 
jungle patrolling in which insurgents were ahead contrary to the government. The 
superiority over the terrain lies in the insurgent‟s knowledge of the area that they 
were fighting. 
This advantage of communist insurrection created a favorable condition at the begin-
ning of the insurgency. However, with the set up of jungle warfare training schools, 
this process changed to the opposite direction, where the Malayan government 
started to benefit from tactical and operational actions. First school, known as the 
Ferret Force, was established by Walter Walker. The training schools were consisted 
of 167 hours of practical training on spending the day in jungle, jungle routing, and 
tracking. Apart from practical training lectures, seminars also took place (Sunder-
land, 1964: 45) to assist and educate the military personal, commanders and figh-
ters
31
.  
                                                 
31
 Contradictory approach to Sunderland‟s argument (1964) on the uselessness of training schools was 
Jones (1996). Jones (1996: 284) posed that many of the soldiers had already fought in Burma, which 
provided them the necessary knowledge on irregular warfare and basic level of training. Yet, training 
schools had rendered the Malayan military a basic tenet: every case has its own characteristics; there-
fore, countering mechanism ought to be different in Malaya. 
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5.1.1.2 Leadership in Malayan Emergency: Lieutenant General Sir Harold 
Briggs and General Sir Gerald Templer  
The course of insurgency changed favorable to the side of Malayan Government and 
British forces in February 1952, when General Sir Gerald Templer, known as the 
“Tiger of Malaya”, was assigned to finalize the stalemate in favor of the colonial 
government. Leadership was vital to end the struggle. In this regard, the two Gener-
als‟ policies by using the proposed components of winning hearts and minds had 
provided success.  
General Templer was assigned both as High Commissioner and Director of Opera-
tions to Malaya (Mockaitis, 1990: 216). Templer‟s major intention was to direct Chi-
nese population to the side of government. In parallel to this idea, he grasped Mao‟s 
metaphor of fish and the water
32
 and used it against the insurgents. He is considered 
as the founding father of the concept of winning hearts and minds
33
 in countering 
insurgency as he employed the following argument (cited in Kilcullen 2004: 36):  
The shooting side of this business is only 25 percent of the trouble; the other 
75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us…The answer lies 
not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the 
people.  
 
 
                                                 
32
 For the direct quotation of Mao on fish and the water, see in the thesis Chapter III: 26 
33
 Mao Tse-Tung can be considered as the person who indirectly contributed to the concept of winning 
hearts and minds. He revealed the significance of the population to the insurgencies. On the other 
hand, General Templer had recognized the same vitality. He transformed this understanding from 
insurgency to population to state to population.   
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Templer achieved his goal to win the hearts and minds of the population in several 
steps. The prominent one was to carry out the Briggs Plan,
34
 which was to “resettle 
hundreds of villages” (Smith, 2001: 61). With this objective he created village coun-
cils inside the New Villages
35. The “resettlement program” restored the villages to 
“fenced and defensible” areas (Sunderland, 1964: vi-vii). Guards, who were Chinese 
in origin, but working for the government, were responsible to protect and defense 
the new villages. The selection of guards from moderate Chinese people was a wise 
strategy that facilitated to break the resistance of radical people. The logic behind the 
creation of those villages was to prevent the local support in terms of providing 
supply of food and shelter, and the flow of intelligence. That is the reason why Sun-
derland (1964) named the villages as fenced areas. 
Fencing the villages was a productive policy on the grounds that, since intelligence 
units could fully inspect the villages. Apart from that, General Briggs‟s food denial 
program gave the police the opportunity to acquire intelligence from the villagers. As 
Mockaitis (1990: 116-117) argues, in the aftermath of the initiation of the stated pro-
grams, some villagers were being observed for over weeks and were taken under 
custody. Food denial program was effective in terms of “putting pressure on the in-
surgents” due to the scarcity of the food (Hack, 1999: 100-103). 
                                                 
34
 The original plan of resettlement was Harold Briggs‟s, who was the former Director of Operations 
before Templer. During Briggs, the resettlement project had formed; however, fencing villagers was 
not active. Villagers could leave the fence to work which would enable them to get into contact with 
the insurgents. General Templer‟s effective policies regarding villages by securing the villages with 
home guards produce a new momentum to the Briggs Plan.  
35
 During General Briggs‟s era those areas are called as “resettlement areas”; however, after General 
Templer‟s success they were known as New Villages (Ramakrishna, 2001: 88).    
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However, food denial program did not end the stalemate on the course of the insur-
gency. Insurgents continued their harsh raids even after the Briggs Plan. As Mockai-
tis (1990) states, General Briggs had no power on the civil military cooperation. Al-
though, General Briggs was the Director of Operations, he could not use his power 
neither on the military nor on the police. To be effective, General Briggs needed the 
High Commissioner‟s power, Sir Henry Gurney, to “energize the system by instilling 
in his subordinates a sense of emergency” (Mockaitis, 1990: 119). After the retire-
ment of Briggs and the assassination of Gurney, Templer acquired both positions. He 
became the men, who unified the civil position with the military, which marked the 
breaking point of the insurgency.  
The impact of a leader during an insurgency or in a struggle against terrorism should 
not be underestimated. General Templer‟s effort to generate a new society was an 
accomplishment of a leader, who knew the terrain well.  
 
5.1.1.3 Intelligence during the Emergency 
Concerning intelligence gathering, General Templer asked assistance from a British 
expert, John Morton. As Mahnken (2007) states, Morton suggested the increase on 
the resources of intelligence activities. Moreover, encouragement of villagers to re-
veal information was beneficial to trace the activities and plans of the insurgents 
(Mahnken, 2007: 73).  
Hack (1999: 217) underlines the necessity of new villages for intelligence purposes 
by stressing that Malayan government had lacked the Communist counter-
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intelligence. That is why insurgents killed approximately 100 villagers in a month. 
They killed villagers who betrayed them. In this regard, the strategy of the insurgents 
was to create fear among others who could possibly betray. However, these incidents 
occurred before the settlement project. New villages program was successful. It em-
powered to “collect rates and taxes, control their own budget and education” (Mahn-
ken, 2007: 66), which provided a certain level of freedom from the center. 
All of these attempts were achieved by intelligence gathering from the villages. Soft 
power initiative of the government was highly effective, since insurgents could not 
live without popular support. Contrary to this point, Hack (1999: 212) opposes the 
impact of winning hearts and minds campaign during Emergency, referring to the 
coercive methods of military with the program named “population control”. In reali-
ty, population control was General Brigg‟s plan through the formation of new settle-
ments. Counter to General Brigg, Templer had converted the campaign into the 
struggle of winning hearts and minds.
36
 Hack‟s (1999) point on massive use of power 
and controlling the population by fencing them with small villages seems to be lack-
ing from proper logic, since Chinese moderates in villages wanted to be secure.  
Beside to the intelligence, the improvement of living conditions, evaluating the quali-
ty of life by checking the sanitation and agricultural lands in the villages, as well as 
Templer‟s effort to grant citizenship rights to large numbers of ethnic Chinese minor-
ity initiated the component of attitude and behavior change on Chinese population. 
                                                 
36
 Although either population control or winning hearts and minds serve for the same cause, they are 
different in term of conceptualization. The former has the negative connotation, whereas winning 
hearts and minds has positive connotation. Literally words and concepts can have the power to trans-
form the conflict, depending on their usage. What Templer has achieved by transforming the concept 
rests on his differentiation of the concept from a negative connotation.    
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5.1.1.4 Strategic Communication, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare dur-
ing the Emergency 
Propaganda and Psychological warfare methods were the key stones to succeed in 
war. Leaflets dropping and the use of speakers by British forces to curtail the morale 
of the insurgents were the main methods of propaganda and psychological opera-
tions. 
Kumar Ramakrishna (2001: 87), head of the Centre of Excellence for National Secu-
rity at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, analyses 
Templer‟s period with glorification. According to Ramakrishna, fear was the driving 
force that led the moderates either to be silent or chose to be with the insurgents. He 
addresses the implementation of propaganda in governmental services that gave cou-
rage not to fear from Communist insurgency.  
General Templer‟s success also derives from the very usage of strategic communica-
tion skills. He announced the government‟s success via Radio Malaya and appre-
ciated the villagers whom overthrew the insurgents (Ramakrishna, 2001: 88-89). 
Postill (2003), who submitted a paper in a conference on the usage of media sources 
during Malayan Emergency, identifies the impact of communication by stressing that 
not only campaigns does matter but also “words should accompany to the deeds.” 
Postill (2003) examines an ethnically different tribal group in today‟s Malaysia and 
forms a new term “sustainable propaganda” with regard to this specific group. From 
the study of Postill (2003), on the current Malaysian structure, sustainable propa-
ganda was initiated during the transformation of the institutions. Yet, propaganda 
can be sustainable to the time until the state achieves its goals. During the Malayan 
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Emergency the use of media deliberately was to gather Malayan moderates. After the 
end of the Emergency (1960) it was no longer significant. 
 
5.1.1.5 Civil-Military Relations during the Emergency 
In addition to the creation of new settlements, joint committees
37
, which had operat-
ed locally, were established. With this establishment, military achieved the flexibility 
to conduct operations. Yet again, Templer created harmony between operational, 
tactical and structural level in Malaya. 
As Templer announced, “Any idea that the business of normal civil government and 
the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and 
all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated” (cited in Smith, 2001: 
65). The interconnectedness of the local government to the process and linking it 
with the military structure had rendered the British struggle purposeful, since the 
local government was requisite for assistance.  
 
5.1.1.6 Use of force during the Emergency 
Another principle of Britain in Malaya was to use minimum force in the aim of rein-
forcing the legitimacy of the local government on behalf of the population. This no-
tion was interlinked to the hearts and minds campaign. It highlighted the significance 
of political dimension in counter-insurgency rather than solely of jungle patrolling. 
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 Joint committees took orders from the center but operated locally.  
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According to this principle it can be concluded that Malayan Government and sol-
diers had not use improportionate force.  
The rest of the principles as assigning experts, who knew the language, culture and 
the terrain provided the success of Britain to win the war in Malaya. British officers 
used propaganda and psychological warfare to convince the population that the gov-
ernment had the capability and power to end the insurgency and through intelligence 
gathering this verbal capability was put into action.  
 
5.1.2 Vietnam War 
 
5.1.2.1 Historical Overview of Vietnam War 
After WORLD WAR II, the U.S. President Roosevelt requested Britain and France 
to withdraw their powers from colonized countries and gave independence to the 
colonial states. In that case, Britain chose to withdraw from Malaya with a transfor-
mation immediately, yet resulted by a struggle. However France, dominating Indo-
china over half a century, did not wish to turn over the territory, since the era was the 
expansion of communism. Vietnamese insurgents, who were fed up with several oc-
cupations- French domination before WORLD WAR II, Japanese occupation during 
the war, and once more French colonial regime after the war- had initiated insurgen-
cy tactics on France, which led hard times to French government in 1945. 
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Vietnamese insurgency is considered to be more communism oriented than nationa-
listic. With respect to this point Nixon (1985) and Hamilton (1998) had two contra-
dictory views. Nixon considers the North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh more of a 
communist rather than a nationalist. Nixon (1985: 35) gave the facts of Ho Chi 
Ming‟s cooperation with France in 1946 to tackle and kill “hundreds of leaders and 
thousand of rank-and file members of nationalist groups”; so that there would be no 
nationalist discourse to challenge the communist struggle. Hamilton (1998: 66), on 
the other hand, stressed the struggle of Minh during the Japanese invasion as a fact in 
which Ming had assisted the allied powers with intelligence. Yet, Nixon‟s statement 
is more convincing based on Ming‟s own declaration on a newspaper in which Ming 
stated nationalism as a “dangerous phenomenon” that tackles communism (cited in 
Nixon, 1985: 33). 
During the struggle, Ngo Dinh Diem was the Prime Minister had sympathy to France 
under the Emperor Bao Dai. Diem‟s anti communist actions with forceful regulations 
in Vietnam villages had catalyzed the nationalistic struggle in the southern region 
too. Apart from the northern resistance, groups inside the southern region had 
launched armed resistance against Diem‟s excessive regulations. Diem‟s wrong as-
sessment on the assumption that “controlling the population” would create loyalty 
inevitably (Department of Defense, 1971a: 131) had produced a negative result: di-
verting the population from the government to the insurgency. The complicated es-
sence of the insurgency with communist struggle in the north and nationalist struggle 
in the southern part of Vietnam, as well as insufficient encounter of France to cease 
the insurgency, led the U.S. penetration into the region. 
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Although during the presidency of Roosevelt, the U.S. government supported de-
colonization whole over the world in general and Vietnam in particular, the fell of 
Dien Bien Phu
38
, in 1954, had forced the US government to enter into a war that was 
not desired at all. However, during 1950s the idea of “domino theory”39 had its peak 
point to the U.S. policy in which the US believed “the loss of Vietnam would be the 
loss of whole Southeast Asia which would be the victory of communism” (Depart-
ment of Defense, 1971b: 54). This was the scariest scenario of Cold War and the 
U.S. foreign policy was confined to the reality of entering the war. Nixon (1985) 
assessed the U.S. involvement to the Vietnam War not as being punctual, and Nixon 
advocated that the interference should have happened before the loss of Dien Bien 
Phu. Yet the US fell into the trap of insurgency, a battle that they were not used to.  
Actions of France against the insurgents were inactive during the fall of Dien Bien 
Phu in 1954. For instance as The Pentagon Papers stated the “statistics on the ethnic 
composition of the defending garrison of Dien Bien Phu”, Viet officers were few 
compared to the French officers. Although the Vietnamese fighting units were 40% 
of all troops, the Vietnamese officers were simply the 3% of the whole group (De-
partment of Defense, 1971b: 68). Therefore France‟s incapability to create indigen-
ous forces under the command of Vietnamese leaders was the major error. Further-
more France had never wholly achieved reliability from the Vietnamese population 
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 Dien Bien Phu is a town at northwest Vietnam. 
39
 Domino Theory first appeared on the U.S. agenda during Korean War in which China appeared on 
the scene to be the possible interferer. International arena had the fear from the likelihood of Chinese 
interference to Indochina, since it would destroy the reason of the war, which was to keep communism 
under control. The same pattern of understanding had also been seen in the Vietnam War, questioning 
the likelihood of Chinese interference and changing the course of the war. 
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since it hesitated on giving full independence to Vietnam. Starting from 1948 to 1950 
it recognized the Bao Dai government step by step; first accepted the independence 
of Vietnam but kept the charge inside the army and governmental functioning and 
then verified its independence in 1949 by stating that Vietnam is an Associated State 
of the French Union (Department of Defense, 1971b: 58). In February 7, 1949 the 
U.S. government recognized Vietnam as an “independent state within the French 
Union” (U.S. Congress, July 1967: 43-44). In 1950s the U.S. government‟s interfe-
rence to the conflict after a request from the French side, began with enlarging the 
monetary assistance to the southern region. The U.S. assistance to Vietnam multip-
lied hundred times from $10 million in 1950 to $1,063 million in 1954 (Department 
of Defense, 1971b: 76). 
The Pentagon Papers stated the major difference between France and the U.S with 
regard to foreign policy as France fighting against colonial opposition, whereas the 
U.S. fighting against the spread of communism. The foreign policy methods of 
France can be interpreted as a transition strategy; however the lack of popular sup-
port to Bao Dai government, since it was observed as a puppet of France and U.S., 
had lacked the possibility to win the battle for hearts and minds. In 1951 John F. 
Kennedy put forward the significance of winning the population in Vietnam issuing 
the below statement (cited in Department of Defense 1971b: 72) in the U.S. Senate in 
June 1953: 
…regardless of our unified effort, it is a truism that the war can never be suc-
cessful unless large numbers of the people of Vietnam are won over from 
their sullen neutrality and open hostility to it and fully support its successful 
conclusion.”. 
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The history was not on the side of neither France nor the U.S. in the Vietnam War. 
The U.S. encountered to strong resistance, since the majority of the population was 
on the side of the insurgents. Although the U.S officials agreed on the effectiveness 
of methods that Britain had used in Malaya and requested Robert Thompson, the 
British advisor in Malayan Emergency, the U.S. strategists could not exercise the 
exact methods in Vietnam. Besides, Thompson could not assist the military efficient-
ly as he had done in Malaya.  
Moreover, the United States Marine Corps refused to learn British techniques offered 
by British Advisory Mission (Nagl, 2005: 115). Based on the conventional war expe-
rience, especially on the Korean War the U.S. tried to shape its strategy, since the 
U.S was inured to the characteristics of counter-insurgency. On the article War, Cul-
ture and the Interpretation of History Johnson named the Vietnam strategy as falla-
cious since Americans used American style and values throughout the war (Johnson, 
1998: 84-85) which were more of a conventional thinking. In addition, probably the 
major strategic fault of the U.S. was to adopt massive military means to suppress the 
insurgents. Psychological operations that the U.S. used, aircrafts to deter the popula-
tion, created insecurity among the public; which resulted by the loss of population 
support (Rouse: 8). 
The administration during John F. Kennedy in 1961 concentrated on guerilla warfare 
and counter-insurgency. Nonetheless Kennedy faced resistance from the U.S. army. 
The army opposed to the request of Kennedy to create Special Forces concerning 
counter-insurgency stating the political conditions of Cold War. Huge expenses on 
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“massive retaliation” doctrine during Eisenhower government had lacked the budget 
of the army with regard to counter insurgency. More to the point, the education of 
Marine Corps on counter-insurgency seemed too costly (Nagl, 2005: 126). Hamilton 
(1998: 124) described the U.S. policy-makers posture in Vietnam as “arrogant”, con-
cluding that army did not have any effort to suppress the insurgents other than con-
ventional means. Yet, President Kennedy authorized the military forces to fight com-
bat struggle for the first time in 1963 (Nixon, 1985: 73). Moreover, in general, in the 
year 1963, Diem was killed by the pro coup general, followed up by President Ken-
nedy‟s assassination, only three weeks after Diem‟s death. 
To assess Vietnam War in detail the components of winning hearts and minds would 
be helpful.   
 
5.1.2.2 Intelligence during the Vietnam War 
In 1957 General Williams stated that CIA could not perform its duties on intelligence 
gathering; therefore he asked for a local intelligence unit composed of South Viet-
namese soldiers. In 1960 the request was accepted, and the local army was trained by 
the U.S. intelligence units to acquire information on Viet-Cong (Hamilton, 1998: 
123). 
Moreover, before leaving the office, Eisenhower initiated the documentation of 
Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam. The plan stated the basic necessity of intelli-
gence and emphasized the lack of “military intelligence capability” since the “civi-
lian communication systems in the provinces were inadequate.” (Country Team Stuff 
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Committee, 1961) It was the administration under J.F. Kennedy who made the plan 
as a “hallmark initiative of South Vietnam strategy” in 1961 (Hamilton, 1998: 134). 
In 1961 Sir General Robert Thompson, who had also worked during the Malayan 
Emergency, came as an assistant to Vietnam to teach the necessary requirements to 
fight insurgency to the Diem‟s government. In this particular subject, the Strategic 
Hamlet Program (code name Operation Sunrise), “to pull the population from the 
side of the insurgents and to prevent insurgent‟s penetration into the hamlets” was 
Thompson‟s main strategy (Hamilton, 1998: 142). Since the effectiveness of a simi-
lar plan was tested in Malaya, Thompson considered that it could be successful in 
Vietnam as well. The program was more than hamlets; its aim was to create “pacifi-
cation” (Department of Defense, 1971a: 128-131) which would stop the population‟s 
reliance on the insurgents. 
Before Operation Sunrise, during the French rule of Vietnam, France had tried to 
create secure zones. In 1959 the government had created “Rural Community Devel-
oping Centers” by relocating the peasants. However, none of the initiatives had been 
successful due to the unexpected discomfort and psychological outcomes over the 
peasants. At the first half of 1961, the Strategic Hamlet Program had also a converse 
effect and insurgents killed 2000 people, from officials, civilians and Republic of 
Vietnam Armed Forces. The main reason of mass killings was the lack of intelli-
gence gathering during the administration of Diem, since Diem did not have success-
ful communication skills both with military officials and province chiefs (Depart-
ment of Defense 1971a: 139-142). 
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In late 1960s by the U.S. Marine Corps‟ Combined Action Program (CAP), which 
was akin to the New Villages program of Britain during Malayan Emergency, the 
U.S. tried to create a secure area that both corps and villagers live together, which 
would be supportive to achieve intelligence. With this initiative, Civilian Irregular 
Defense Groups worked in accordance with CAP, to secure the border and achieve 
valuable intelligence (Cassidy, 2004: 75-76). 
 
5.1.2.3 Propaganda during the Vietnam War 
Propaganda methods were used both by Viet-Cong and the alliance during the Viet-
nam War. The former used efficient propaganda methods to win the population, rely-
ing mainly on negative connotation of winning hearts and minds in theory, which 
was persuasion through coercive means. They systematically attacked not only the 
military bases and governmental places/personal, but also to civilians. They delibe-
rately attacked civilians to show that the government was not capable of protecting 
them. Based on the numbers, communist murdered 36,725 South Vietnamese in the 
years 1957-1973. Based on the former facts, Nixon formed the “hearts and minds” 
approach used by insurgents on the strategy of creating hatred (Nixon, 1985: 51-53). 
Aside from attacking to civilians, insurgents put to death “village and hamlet offi-
cials” by their aggressive strategy (Country Team Stuff Committee, 1961). 
The use of propaganda had two conflictual sides from the American perspective. 
Although American military forces dropped leaflets for surrender in Vietnam, the 
American media in the U.S. put pressure on the U.S. government with the expression 
that the U.S. should not fight a war in Vietnam. Besides, the U.S. media condemned 
 83 
 
Diem‟s policy in Vietnam due to its incomprehensiveness. Diem‟s coercive methods 
on persuading the people and the media had backfired and created hatred among the 
population. For this reason, as Nixon (1985: 64-65) stated, reporters in the U.S. me-
dia had represented Diem as an “extreme Catholic”, who repressed both the national-
ists and Buddhists, with a claim that 70% of the population is Buddhist in Vietnam. 
Whereas, Nixon stressed that the Buddhist residents were 30% of the population. 
This propagandist posture of the U.S. reporters against the Diem government was 
also in effect on the creation of a mind-set with the view of “the U.S. takes the wrong 
side of the war in wrong time” (Nixon, 1985: 64-65). 
Another method of propaganda during the war was Saigon Songs by the singer Maj. 
Gen. Ed Lansdale of the US Army, who labeled the campaign in the name of hearts 
and minds with the “hope to persuade the villagers” to fight against or at least refuse 
the Vie-Cong resistance (Bell 2008). The songs were broadcasted via radio and 
named as “heart songs” that addressed directly to the heart of the targeted population 
(Bell 2008). 
The poems about the U.S. soldiers during the war combat in Vietnam also showed 
the tragic conditions and the hesitation that the U.S. soldiers were in. In this regard 
the book Winning Hearts and Minds: War Poems by Vietnam Veterans demonstrates 
the tragic psychology of the veterans both in the war that they were fighting and to 
the U.S. government. Two poems (Binno and Valentine, 1973: 1023), illustrate the 
U.S. soldiers‟ condition quite sound and clear: 
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We were on patrol last night; 
And as we moved along, 
We came upon one of the enemy. 
 
Strange, in the bright moon 
He did not seem an enemy at all 
He had arms and legs, a head… 
… and a rifle 
I shot him. (by W. D. Ehrhart) 
…………. 
Ask what kind of war is it 
where you can be pinned down 
all day in a muddy rice paddy 
while your buddies are being shot 
and a close-support Phantom jet 
that has been napalming the enemy 
wraps itself around a tree and explodes 
and you cheer inside? (by Larry Rottmann) 
 
 
5.1.2.4 Use of force during the Vietnam War 
The use of massive force during the Vietnam War was extensive. Although the U.S. 
government was aware of the fact that it was not a conventional war as world wars, it 
chose the method based on hard power. On August 7, 1964, Congress issued a state-
ment “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of 
the United States and to prevent further aggression” (Joint Resolution of Congress, 
1964). To achieve this aim, the U.S. trust in its air power, mainly to helicopters, jets 
and “sophisticated weapons” which rendered the “Vietnam War a testing ground for 
the U.S. military” (Nastasi, 2001). Thereof, it would be accurate to remark the un-
used of minimum use of force during the Vietnam War.      
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5.1.3 Assessment of Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War 
According to Nagl (2005), organizational culture of Britain is accustomed to limited 
war understanding on the process of learning; whereas the in U.S. organizational 
culture, war is subjected to national interest which is a threat to national existence. 
For this reason, the U.S. had a simplistic view: when war starts politics ends. Nagl 
(2005) describes Britain as a learning institution that drives conclusions from each 
war/insurgency, whereas the U.S. as a non-learning institution that strove in non-
conventional wars with conventional methods. The U.S. major flow in the Vietnam 
War stands on the basic premise, which is every case, is unique and the management 
of every case needs unique methods.  Due to this reasoning, the U.S. endeavors to 
adopt British methods of Malaya into the Vietnam War, did not facilitate the U.S. 
initiatives.  
In the first chapter of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Nagl (2005) stress institu-
tions, mainly armies, as a learning institution. According to the organizational theory 
that Nagl portrays states build their new knowledge on, the past experiences that they 
are exposed to. Therefore, written documents such as doctrines are helpful to witness 
the past experience and to build on the reality of what they are facing that time (Nagl, 
2005: 3-7). The U.S. Field Manual (Department of the Army Headquarters), based 
on the methods of counter-insurgency is a good example on this point. Yet British 
Government did not have doctrines during and after the Malayan Emergency, which 
may be the belief on doctrines would curb new initiatives in countering a non-
conventional warfare. This thesis supports the view that past experience can be help-
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ful; only if the decision-makers assess the reality on the existing situation; however, 
assessing a situation, while it is happening is a difficult task to accomplish. 
Britain had suffered at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency. It even came to the 
brick of losing the struggle. However, the employment of the components of winning 
hearts and minds were accurate and enabled British government to win the war. On 
contrary to the hard measures over the Vietnamese people- the use of B-52 bombers 
had caused civilian casualties and wrong operations with chemical sprays to ruin the 
rice supplies in Vietnam had resulted by “birth defects in Vietnamese children” and 
even on the U.S. officials (cited in Nagl, 2005: 200) 
40
- led the U.S to tackle the 
Vietnam War nothing more than conventional strategies. 
One of the other differences between the U.S and British army was about the ranking 
system inside the army forces. British forces were always more flexible and open to 
innovations in which the ranks of the military officials did not endanger the status 
among them to communicate to a low rank soldier; whereas the U.S army command 
and control system was quite hierarchal. With the assumption that a fascinating idea, 
which could divert the course of the war, could not come from a low rank sol-
dier/officer, the low ranking officers could not deliver their ideas to the top, due to 
the hierarchy. Thomas Mockaitis (1990: 175) attributes the flexibility of the British 
system stemming from the effect of “social structure” on the military. 
Moreover, Britain used small operation units in jungle patrolling in which the Gener-
al of the unit could appoint his decisions during the combat. Opposite to the British 
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 Cited in John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with A Knife, 2005, Andrew J. Krepinevich, The Army 
and Vietnam, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1986: 201). 
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method, the U.S. was in favor of massive military operations from the center, 
planned in advance, to hunt down the insurgents. Regrettably, the U.S. could not put 
the civilian side into play. Hereof, Sir Robert Thompson (Department of Defense 
1971a, 146) emphasized the failure of the U.S. on refusing to admit that the problem 
was connected to political branch in rural areas, rather than to the loss of territory in 
unpopulated territories. Thompson was also aware of the fact that failure on a battle 
would mean the loss of territory but the problem was more than an area per se, the 
population‟s requests ought to be considered as the key point to win the war.  
This part of the thesis seeks to argue the implementations of countering insurgency 
methods by taking Malayan Emergency and Vietnam as case studies. The U.S. ac-
tions in Vietnam on contrary to British methods in Malaya had occurred from the 
difference of the mindset of the two states. Britain, as being an imperial power, is 
more familiar with fighting both in its continent and in parts. Whereas the U.S. 
fought conventional wars throughout its history such as American Civil War, Two 
World Wars, the Korean War and could not transfer its conventional experience to 
unconventional warfare. Nevertheless methods in Iraq resemble the methods in Ma-
laya, which can be seen as an evidence for the transformation of the U.S mindset in 
recent years (see Chapter VI). 
 
5.2 Madrid Attacks and London Bombings 
There are two weak points for a terrorist organization to survive. A terrorist organi-
zation needs recruitment to its network as well as reaction to its attacks (response). 
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States can prevent recruitment only when it achieves the support of the moderates. 
Similarly, the reaction of the states should be based on winning the hearts and minds 
of the moderate population. Response and recruitment are two sides of a coin that are 
bind to each other. For a successful counter terrorism action, these two sides should 
be taken into consideration. Basically, there should be an action (an attack of a ter-
rorist organization) that states can react (state policy). The action-reaction circle 
works to the benefit of the terrorist organizations, but states can challenge the 
process by focusing on response (state policy).  
Since states cannot agree upon a comprehensive definition on terrorism, it is a habi-
tual action to respond terrorist attacks either by hard measures. Nonetheless, the con-
ventional methods are proven to be erroneous, since terrorist organizations act in a 
complex and different manner than states do. Besides, terrorist organizations are de-
centralized units unlike states. Al-Qaeda and its sub-branches had concluded two 
major attacks on the European peninsula: Madrid attacks (2004) and London bomb-
ings (2005). Based on Al-Qaeda‟s goals, these attacks can be seen as an opposition to 
Western existence in the Middle Eastern region. 
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Although there are similarities of Britain and Spain, they had responded similar kind 
of an attack in a different manner. The similarities of Britain and Spain are: both 
states are from the same region, they have faced domestic terrorism inside their bor-
der previously. After September 11, Al-Qaeda organized an attack in train stations in 
both countries. However, Britain relied more on community policing; whereas Spain 
relied on traditional policing after the attack to win the Muslim population inside 
their territory. Below table shows the similarities clearly: 
Table 1: Comparison of Madrid Attacks and London Bombings  
 Spain England 
Region Europe Europe 
Connection with countering 
terrorism 
ETA- Domestic Ter-
rorism 
IRA-Domestic Ter-
rorism 
The year of terrorist attack 
After 9/11 (March 11, 
2004) 
After 9/11 (July 7, 
2005) 
Attacked place* 4 train stations 
3 train stations and 1 
bus 
Attack Type Suicide bombing Suicide bombing 
The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda 
State response 
More traditional po-
licing 
Community policing 
measures 
 90 
 
As it can be seen from the table, regardless of the similarities between the two states 
in terms of region and connection with countering terrorism, Spain and England 
faced an attack from Al-Qaeda after September 11. Yet, state responses (in terms of 
domestic policy regulations) to their Muslim citizens varied.  
 
5.2.1 Madrid Attacks 
On 11 March 2004, Spain faced four explosions in Madrid subway which caused 191 
casualties and injured more than 1000 people. Partido Popular (PP), the party in 
power led by Jose Maria Aznar (2004) accused ETA for the responsibility of the ac-
tions. This was a rapid response of the government without the consultancy of the 
intelligence unit. In reality, the attack was conducted by homegrown terrorists mainly 
Moroccan in origin, who were part of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (see 
Global Security). The group had connections both with Algerian Jihadist Networks 
and a Syrian originated Abu Dandah Network, which were linked to Al-Qaeda (Jor-
dan and Horsburgh 2005). The mastermind of the attack was Allekema Lamari, who 
is an Algerian in origin.  
The statistics show that from 1995 to 2004, 83 Algerian origin suspects were arrested 
with the diminishing number of 40 Moroccans and 21 Syrians (Jordan and Hors-
burgh, 2005: 173) in Spain. This data demonstrates that the attack could be prevented 
in advance. However, Spanish intelligence could not predict such an attack.  
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March 11 attacks on Madrid subway were important for two reasons. First, the at-
tacks took place three days before the elections in Spain. Secondly, in the aftermath 
of the attacks foreign policy of Spain directly changed.  
 
5.2.1.1 Why Spain as a Target? 
Although Spanish public tried to hamper the involvement in Iraqi War by February 
15 demonstrations, Aznar did not change the Spanish foreign policy. Three days after 
March 11 attacks, Spanish society selected a new government. The Socialists won 
the elections by 42%, whereas the Popular Party got 38% of the votes (BBC News). 
Georgina Blakeley (2006: 242) conducted a survey on 2004 elections. Blakeley 
(2006) stated that although Popular Party hold the opposition parties responsible for 
the demonstrations, it was the failure of the Popular Party for not handling the bomb-
ings prudently. The Spanish citizens‟ response through the elections was inevitable, 
since even before the Madrid bombings citizens performed huge demonstrations. 
Moreover, it was the government of Aznar that ignored public support in the struggle 
against terrorism. Luis Moreno (2005), a Research Fellow in Spanish National Re-
search Council, explains Aznar‟s denial of Islamic Fundamentalism after Madrid 
attacks with reference to two political stances that Aznar faced. First, the acceptation 
of Islamic fundamentalism would damage Aznar‟s policies in parallel to Britain and 
the USA in Iraq. Second, holding ETA responsible for the attacks legitimized Az-
nar‟s policies on Basque nationalities (Moreno, 2005: 66).  
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5.2.1.2 The Spanish Response to the Attacks 
Initially, Aznar‟s policies against ETA were regarded positively by the public. Az-
nar‟s government legitimized its actions on ETA and declared full support to “war on 
terrorism” by stating that there was “no fundamental difference between ETA and 
Al-Qaeda” (Woodworth, 2004: 177). In his statement to Wall Street Journal in 24 
March 2004, Aznar put his words as follows: “ETA or Al Qaeda the difference is 
important, to be sure, but the response to what has happened should be the same: 
firmness, political unity and international cooperation.” 
In psychological terms, Aznar coped with “cognitive dissonance,” when he could not 
decide on the perpetrator of the attack: Al Qaeda or ETA? Cognitive dissonance is “a 
feeling of uncomfortable tension which comes from holding two conflicting thoughts 
in the mind at the same time.” Scholars offer three solutions to eliminate the pressure 
in decision making: (1) to change one‟s own previous behavior, (2) to justify one‟s 
own behavior by changing the conflicting cognition, and (3) to justify one‟s own 
behavior by adding new cognitions (see Changing Minds). Aznar did not change his 
position even though Arnoldo Otegi, spokeman of Batasuna, supported ETA‟s inno-
cence concerning the attacks (Inter Press Service). He probably had the second con-
dition in which he tried to change the conflicting cognition by blaming ETA and the 
opposition parties. 
Right after being elected, the Socialist Party leader Zapatero declared “the war and 
the occupation in Iraq as a disaster” (BBC News). In accordance to this statement, 
the European newspapers were divided into two groups about the withdrawal of 
Spanish forces from Iraq. The conservative newspapers, such as ABC, defended that 
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the withdrawal of troops was a grand mistake (Global Security 2004). On the other 
hand, the leftist newspapers, such as El Pais, observed the war in Iraq under the 
framework of illegality and wrongness. (Global Security, 2004). 
The component of intelligence of winning hearts and minds was not taken into con-
sideration by Spanish intelligence units. The weeks before March 11, Spanish intelli-
gence disregarded the message about the “plan to steal 150 kilos of explosives, 
which were said to be used in Madrid attacks” (Woodworth 2004, 179). Moreover, 
the Spanish intelligence unit did not consider the message about Spain‟s vulnerability 
on internet either. In this regard, an Islamic Research Center E-Prism translated a 
booklet which was written by a group Information Commission for the Help of the 
Iraqi People: The Department of Foreign Propaganda Baghdad. “Global Islamic Me-
dia” shared the message in the under the title of A Message to the Spanish People 
(Paz, 2004a). The booklet started with Aznar‟s support of the U.S. government on 
the war on terror and condemned the two thousand Spanish troops that were dep-
loyed in Iraq. The booklet of Foreign Propaganda in Iraq (Paz, 2004a) went further 
and blamed Aznar‟s government for putting the Spanish people into danger. This 
strategy of the terrorist organization can be evaluated as a strategic communication 
method to instill fear on the public. Their message ended with the following state-
ment: “The battalions of the Iraqi resistance and its supporters outside of Iraq are 
able to increase the dosage and will eclipse your memorandum of the rotten spies” 
(Paz, 2004a: 8). Yet, the Spanish intelligence unit did not examine this message 
properly. 
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In accordance to his declarations, Zapatero withdrew Spanish forces- 1.300 troops- 
from Iraq. This policy change can be regarded as a latest terrorism strategy of the 
newly elected government. Yet, this policy change can also be regarded as a success 
of Al-Qaeda (see Avilés, 2004). While it was argued by Rose and Murphy that Madr-
id bombings is a political success for Al-Qaeda, Abrahms opposed this view with the 
argument that the attack is not a political success for Al-Qaeda, since Spain increased 
the number of troops in Afghanistan (Rose et al. 2007). However, the latter view is 
contestable due to the fact that Spanish troops are not combat forces; but they are 
merely the leading Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). However, it can be con-
cluded that the Spanish foreign policy went through a gradual shift. Since the intelli-
gence did not work well before the attacks, National Antiterrorism Coordination 
Centre was created to work closely about international terrorism with “integrated 
intelligence analysis” on May 28, 2004 (Reinares, 2008: 8). 
However, there are still concerns about Spanish law on terrorism. For instance, For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs in UK conducted a survey on selected countries and 
one of them was Spain. The survey stated that Spain does not have a separate anti-
terrorism law, but it regarded terrorism as “aggravated form of crime” (FWA 2005: 
25). On the working paper about Internal Security reforms in Spain, Reinares (2008: 
7) underlined the same point as it is doubtful to melt ETA and other terrorist organi-
zations into the same pot which is the Criminal Code of Spain. Therefore, to what 
extend the terrorists can be considered as criminals or more than that remains a ques-
tion that the Spanish state should focus on.  
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In terms of domestic policy the Spanish government should focus on its citizens, 
since a vast majority of Muslim citizens live in Spain. The government should con-
vince the moderate Muslims that it is not only the Spaniards, who are vulnerable to 
attacks but also Muslim citizens that live in Spain as well.  
Countering terrorism should not be addressed only by foreign policies. Domestic 
policies are important in order to create a common ground for the citizens, where 
cultures, religions, beliefs and nationalities would live together. It is the responsibili-
ty of the government to eradicate the radical groups within the population (Thieux, 
2004: 70).  Only by then, the recruitment policy of Al-Qaeda could be countered. 
In conclusion, the research on the Spanish government‟s policy shows that Spain 
relied more on foreign policy instruments. The literature on this case study indicates 
that after the election of Zapatero significant changes has occurred in the foreign 
policy dimension. The “Alliance of Civilizations”, pioneered by Zapatero and 
Erdoğan is one of the prominent foreign policy actions to understand the Muslim 
mind in other states, generally in Middle East. Yet, Zapatero did not make major 
changes to win the Muslim citizens inside Spain. Besides, Contrary to the claim of 
Paz (2004b), Spanish withdrawal from Iraq did not create a “domino effect41”. 
Therefore, sub-groups in the name of Al-Qaeda conducted another operation to Brit-
ain in 2005. 
                                                 
41
 According to Paz (2004b), Spanish withdrawal would create a domino effect inside the war coali-
tion in Iraq in which “neither British nor Italian forces [could] resist pressure.” 
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5.2.2 London Bombings 
Britain faced four explosions in London, which resulted in 52 casualties, 770 injured 
on July 7, 2005. Three of the explosions occurred close to the train stations and one 
of them exploded in a public transportation bus. The suicide bombers ranging from 
the age 18-30 were home-grown terrorists
42
. As the BBC News (2005) pointed out 
three of the four suicide bombers were living in Leeds West Yorkshire (BBC News 
Special Reports, 2005). The attackers were linked to a senior Al-Qaeda leader in Pa-
kistan. 
Although the intelligence units were aware of such an upcoming attack, they could 
not prevent it (The Economist, 2005). In general, the argument surrounding the vul-
nerability of the cities was the main pretext of the London Resilience Metropolitan 
Police Service for such an excuse (London Assembly, 2006). However, the attack on 
July 21 was prevented in advance by proper intelligence. 
The videos of Mohammad Sidique Khan and Ayman Al-Zawahiri made the perpetra-
tor of the attack clear. (BBC News, 2005). The homegrown terrorism in Britain was 
linked to Al-Qaeda
43
. In April 2007, Americans captured Abd al-Hadi, who was the 
mastermind behind the London bombings
44
. According to Hadi, it is favorable for the 
                                                 
42
 The name of the terrorists are Hasib Hussain, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Germaine Lindsay, Sheh-
zad Tanweer. 
43
 Many small groups acts in the name of Al-Qaeda, since they share the same sensibility and rational-
ity with the latter organization. 
44
 Al-Hadi trained Khan and Tanweer in Pakistani camps for suicide bombing. 
 97 
 
organization to turn homegrown individuals into terrorists since they “know the 
country, know the language and own passports of that country
45” (O‟Neill et al.).  
Britain was thought to be fully equipped to international terrorist attacks, after Sep-
tember 11 attacks and Madrid Bombings in Spain. Besides, Special Branches under 
the Security Service created the New Guidelines that provided the priority of coun-
tering terrorism in 2004 (Gregory, 2005: 3). In addition, 300 cameras were employed 
in Britain to observe illegal and criminal activities (Rasmussen, 2005: 3). However, 
none of the mechanisms prevented the attack. The Review Committee admitted that 
“the key to effective response is based on communication, which is to be considered 
with the public and the individuals who are harmed during the attack” (London As-
sembly Reports, 2006: 12). According to the Review Committee, the best response 
should not be based on the incidents but on individuals and it was the primary mis-
take on July 7 bombings (London Assembly Reports, 2006). In addition, Bland et al. 
(2006) emphasize both military and civilian measures to tackle an attack. In the light 
of the stated reports, Britain has focused on its citizens rather than going for a foreign 
policy change. 
 
5.2.2.1 Why Britain as a Target? 
Since the withdrawal of Spain from the coalition did not create a domino effect as 
Jihadist groups were seeking, the selection of Britain as a target was an inevitable 
                                                 
45
 An interpretation from the view of al-Hadi would be that states should aim to prevent homegrown 
terrorism. Therefore, the British government employed domestic policies through the components of 
winning hearts and minds. 
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consequence. Besides, Britain is a strategic ally of the U.S. government, especially in 
Iraq and Afghanistan
46
.  
The video of London suicide bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan put the very logic 
behind the British bombings as follows: “Until you stop the bombing, gassing, impri-
sonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight” (BBC News, 2005). In 
light of this logic, the British response on its Muslim citizens is important.  
 
5.2.2.2 The British Response to the Attacks 
Britain was in a stalemate between its courts and European Laws In 2004. Nine fo-
reigners detained without any trial and sentenced to prison for almost three years. 
This verdict was against the Human Rights Act in European Union. The duplicity 
occurred due to hard line counter-terrorism measures of Britain, which were titled 
under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. Charles Clarks, the Home 
Secretary, personally defended the action as “the detainees are threat to homeland 
security” (cited in Oliver and Left, 2004). The detainees could go out from prison 
only if they accepted to return to their home country. However, most of them were 
asylum seekers and did not have choice rather than staying (cited in Oliver and Left, 
2004). 
Gardiner (2006: 2) blames the European Laws as an undermining factor for Britain‟s 
anti-terrorism efforts, since Britain cannot enjoy free act within its borders. However, 
                                                 
46
 Britain had more or less 7.200 troops in Iraq and more than 5000 in Afghanistan by 2006. 
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the former application was changed by Counter-Terrorism Act of 2005, which gave 
permission not to detentions but “control orders.” Control orders were designed to 
implement house investigations, house arrests and even restricting the movements of 
individuals (Office of Public Sector Information, 2005: 5). Tony Blair recognized 
control orders as a regular mechanism, which does not “involve detention”. As Blair 
(2007) said, control orders “impose some limits on the individual‟s freedom.” Blair 
(2007) stressed that security should have the priority since without security there will 
be no liberty at all. Although the Blair government asked for 90 days of detention 
time, the House of Commons considered the request and increased it up to 28 days 
(Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, 2006). Control orders can be regarded as 
an intelligence gathering activity of Britain.  
From late 2005, Britain focused on a new strategy, which was community policing. 
According to this new policy, Intelligence and Security Committee admitted the con-
sequences of radicalization and the cost of alienation inside the public and requested 
for a better understanding of radicalized people (Home Office, 2006). Consequently, 
the Home Office published a report, named Preventing Violent Extremism: Next 
Steps for Communities in 2008. In this report, key issues were addressed, such as 
gathering the Muslim scholars on a common base through the aim of British society 
to “understand Islam” and creating forums for young people to discuss and debate 
issues about Islam. This action can be regarded in two components of winning hearts 
and minds, which are public diplomacy, and attitude and behavioral change.   
Apart from creating social understanding, the report put forward preventive measures 
as well. Such measures are the prohibition of violent sources in internet, to increase 
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support of Muslim citizens to challenge radicals, and the prevention of radicalization 
in prison. All of the efforts after 2005 are to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim 
society in London. As it can be interpreted from the policies, the component of stra-
tegic communication, public diplomacy, intelligence gathering are used by the Brit-
ish government.  
Community policing aims to create better communication channels among the Mus-
lim community, the police and British citizens to avoid extremism (Klausen, 2009: 
408). Reaching the Muslim community and emphasizing the common grounds can 
prevent the radicals to find safe havens inside the population. Although Saggar 
(2009) did not state specifically about community policing, he examined counter 
terrorism efforts by stressing the role of fence sitters. According to Saggar (2009), if 
states can divert tacit supporters in support of the state‟s cause, the base of the organ-
ization will be damaged. This is the significance of the recruitment phase for a terror-
ist organization to survive. 
The community policing is the most effective response to terrorism in the long term, 
since the money spend on hard line security measures can be transferred to other 
lacking parts, such as creating job opportunities, education, making infrastructure or 
creating economical equality to the Muslim community in Britain. By establishing 
harmony inside the community, it is possible to achieve stability.  
As Karmani (2006: 104) puts forward, it is not the Muslim community or the Muslim 
language that creates a radical mindset but it is the one that has the power such as the 
media, who creates such mindsets. The survey of Pew Global Attitudes Project in 
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2005 asked the respondents to give an answer to the following question: “Views on 
which religion is the most violent?” British respondents of 63% chose Islam as the 
most violent religion (Bleich, 2009: 368). It is true that Islamic fundamentalism high-
ly increased. With the initiation of community policing and new measures that en-
compass strategic communication, public diplomacy and intelligence, homegrown 
terrorism could diminish in Britain. 
Mosques and prisons are the most effective places to gather for the homegrown ter-
rorists. Therefore, British government also questioned the effectiveness of mosques. 
Some scholars like Bergen and Pandey, oppose the idea that medrese inherently 
cause unpleasant effects on the individual. According to their sample, only 11 % of 
the terrorists attended medrese to take education. Only one man, Hasib Hussain in 
London bombings attended medrese (Bergen and Pandey, 2006: 118-122). Nonethe-
less, not all of the current medrese should be seen as a teaching institution. Some of 
them are places to organize plans. Medrese are problematic, since one can get theo-
logical motives but also training (Ranstorp, 2005) to be a terrorist as well. Three of 
the four London bombers stayed in Pakistan between November 2004 and February 
2005, where they had contacted to Abd al-Hadi. Therefore, there is a need for proper 
intelligence from the mosques and prisons. 
Moreover, the British response relied on strategic communication as well. The scho-
lars’ Roadshow- The Radical Middle Way campaign tried to familiarize British so-
ciety with Islamic theology. In this respect, Muslim scholars gave lectures via inter-
net. This policy was organized in collaboration of Foreign Office with Home Office 
(Modood 2007).  
 102 
 
London bombings taught Britain that the fight should rely on necessary means. Dur-
ing the learning process, Britain shifted from firm methods to soft ones. Traditional 
policing would be favorable to deter home-grown terrorists as far as Britain stayed 
within the rule of law. However, community policing should not be disregarded, be-
cause it is the key stone to undertake terrorism in the long-term. Besides, the policies 
that Britain used on its society to tackle homegrown terrorism, are based on compo-
nents of winning hearts and minds. 
On the other hand, no country is immune to terrorist actions. Ignoring the facts 
would only lead to a new disaster. Therefore, the collaboration of intelligence units, 
police forces and the community would be the paramount long-term response in the 
struggle against terrorism.  
 
5.2.2.3 Assessment of British and Spanish Responses 
Many demonstrations in Spain proved the requirement of domestic policy regulations 
as well as a foreign policy change to display unjust policies in Iraqi war. On the other 
hand, British society did not create a major concern of London bombings in the same 
manner as Spanish society did. According to Freedland (2006), a year after the attack 
nothing significant changed in British people‟s style of living. Freedland (2006) 
stressed the “habits of leisure and transport, the attitudes to politics, the way British 
people live with each other” as examples to his proposed assumption.  
The literature on the implications of policies in Spain indicates that Spanish govern-
ment relied on traditional policing, since it conducted many operations right after the 
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Madrid bombings. The Spanish government arrested individuals, who were affiliated 
to a terrorist organization or who were likely to be terrorists without questioning. 
Besides, there is a gap in Spanish law structure that considers terrorism as equivalent 
to crime. The main question lies whether crime laws would be beneficial to address 
terrorism, since the former is a domestic problem in nature, and the latter is an inter-
national concern.  
On the contrary, Britain as a country which have been suffering from IRA terrorism, 
responded the same phenomenon in a different manner. At first, with the amend-
ments of Terrorism Act 2000, Britain failed to respect the rule of law due to the tight 
nature of emergency. Later in 2005, the Home Office initiated to impel rules, which 
were more based on community policing and social policy. Tony Blair, who was the 
strategic ally of the U.S, did not renounce its strategies upon Al-Qaeda‟s intentions 
and kept the forces both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Concerning the alleged success of 
Al-Qaeda in London, this thesis suggests that Al-Qaeda did not achieve political 
gains; however it gained publicity and imposed fear among the Spanish citizens. 
Last but not the least, both military and police units in collaboration with social poli-
cy and community policing are required in order to fight against terrorism in a com-
prehensive manner. States are not immune from terrorism inherently. Terrorism is a 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced only to bombings or violent acts. This under-
standing reduces the countering mechanism into a reaction phase. The need is to 
adopt new societal precautions in advance.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
In the struggle against terrorism/insurgency, there is a need of understanding the 
concept of winning hearts and minds. The aim of the thesis is to stress the impor-
tance of proposed components in order to understand the concept of winning hearts 
and minds.  
This thesis attempts to fill the gap in literature on the concept of winning hearts and 
minds by examining and formulating the components of winning hearts and minds. 
In other words, the literature lacks in two points: (1) there is a lack of literature based 
mainly on the history of the concept of winning hearts and minds, (2) there is no spe-
cific method of winning the hearts and minds of the targeted population.   
While searching the concept of winning hearts and minds, history provides the 
grounds to the question “whose hearts and minds are to be won?” The main conclu-
sion from the historical investigation is the evolution and transformation of the tar-
geted subject of the concept through time. In early history, the concept of winning 
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hearts and minds had covered the whole population, where taking the consent of the 
public was significant. However, the concept of winning hearts and minds covered 
only the believers with the rise of Christianity in 16
th
 century. When the concept is 
examined in all war times, it is observed that winning hearts and minds of the sol-
diers became the prominent issue. That is to say, soldiers happened to be the targeted 
subject. 
Coming more to the contemporary era, the targeted subject became the population 
once more during the World War I and World War II. However, populations consi-
dered in these wars were both the population of the fighting state and the population 
of the states that should be countered. In the former, the consent of the population of 
the fighting states is needed as well. In the latter, the major aim of a fighting state is 
to win the hearts and minds of a population of a targeted state. 
In the Cold War, the reference subject of winning hearts and minds changed entirely 
to the opponent states‟ population. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. aimed to win 
the hearts and minds of the population of satellite states; whereas, Soviet Union at-
tempted to counter this aim by intercepting the communication channels of the U.S. 
Since there was no actual fighting in the Cold War, winning hearts and minds was 
directly practiced. After the end of the Cold War, the concept of winning hearts and 
minds is observed in conflicts between state and non-state actors. The aim of the 
strategies through the implication of the concept is to isolate the insurgents and lack 
them from basic needs, which are food, shelter, and intelligence. 
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Moreover, the concept is practiced in the struggle against terrorism in contemporary 
era. A state intervening to a territory of another state to prevent the latter‟s assistance 
to a terrorist organization leads to the reliance of the concept once more. Contempo-
rarily, the intervened population becomes the targeted subject, whose hearts and 
minds should be achieved.   
The historical investigation on the concept indicates the second gap in literature, 
which is to say, the components of winning hearts and minds. When the question 
“how to win the hearts and minds?” is asked, the literature does not state explicitly 
the components of the concept. In this regard, the components of winning hearts and 
minds are proposed by examining the contemporary interventions and the policies of 
states during intervention times. In literature, those components are regarded merely 
as a policy for winning a war. However, this thesis defends the view that they are, in 
actual, the components of winning hearts and minds. The proposed components are 
(1) public diplomacy, (2) strategic communication, (3) intelligence, (4) attitude and 
behavioral change, (5) propaganda and psychological warfare. The findings on the 
components of the concept are as follows:  
(1) The components are highly interlinked to each other in the practices of the 
concept through state policies. For instance, propaganda and psychological 
operations can lead to attitude and/or behavioral change, which can further 
lead to intelligence gathering. As a consequence, it can result with winning 
hearts and minds of the targeted population. Radio Free Europe would be a 
concrete example to examine the interaction of the components among each 
other. Radio Free Europe was a successful strategic communication method 
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(through broadcasting), which encompasses propaganda tools (speeches) in 
order to change the attitude of the targeted population (the Hungarian re-
volt)
47
.  
(2)  All of the components of winning hearts and minds are equally important. 
However, the impact of individual components changes from case to case. 
Due to this reason, states should decide on the efficiency of the components 
in different situations. For instance, in World War II intelligence gathering 
was the primary strategy for the powers; whereas propaganda and psycholog-
ical operations led the West to win the Cold War. 
In Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. systematically tries to link these components in the 
struggle against terrorism currently. In Afghanistan General McChrystal requested 
more troops to protect the civilians in 2009. In accordance, the main aim becomes 
taking and holding areas controlled by Taliban. However, it is an ambitious purpose 
and needs time to be accomplished. There are still lacks in terms of implementing the 
proposed components of winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan. For instance in 
the Strategic Communication Plan of 2007 the key audiences are extensive in num-
ber
48
, although strategic communication aims specific audiences. In this regard, ex-
tensive number of key audiences diverts the U.S. and ISAF‟s aim. Besides, the U.S. 
has lack of expertise on Strategic Communication and Information Operations. 
                                                 
47
 See Radio Free Europe, p. 32-36 in this thesis. 
48
 The key audiences are Afghan population, Afghan government, Government of Pakistan, Military 
of Pakistan, Pakistani population, Population of ISAF troops, IGO and NGO communities, U.S. do-
mestic audience, Taliban rank and file, Enemy leadership, Central Asian Populations (Department of 
Defense 2007: 2). 
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Therefore, the implementation of these terms does not effectively working. To win 
the hearts and minds of the Afghani population, the U.S. and NATO forces should 
give the control to the Afghani forces. The Afghani population should feel that they 
are not ruling by a third power but it is going to be their governmental success to 
fight against Taliban.    
The components of winning hearts and minds can be found in Iraq clearly as well. 
The U.S. organizes polls about the opinions of the Iraqi population on the U.S. pres-
ence. This can be regarded as a method of strategic communication. Besides, small 
tickets in replacement of coins are being used in Iraq. On one of the side of these 
tickets there are American soldiers helping Iraqi population. The use of such mate-
rials is to create attitude/behavioral change. Moreover, living conditions especially in 
the northern side of Iraq has improved dramatically. Therefore, the Kurdish popula-
tion has frank sympathy to the U.S. officials. However, the Sunni and Shi‟a com-
munities are still in severe fight. This fight can be prevented by implementing the 
components of winning hearts and minds, generally strategic communication, propa-
ganda and psychological operations. However, there is a lack of expertise on Strateg-
ic Communication and Information Operations in Iraq as well. Therefore, for an ef-
fective campaign in Iraq the U.S. needs more experts who know the area, culture, 
society and the language
49
.           
                                                 
49
 Although “knowing the culture, language and the area” is a well known phrase, the U.S. cannot 
implement it totally. During my stay in northern Iraq, I have witnessed that not many of the U.S. offi-
cials know Kurdish/Arabic. To have communication with the population interpreters were needed. 
Besides, even in northern Iraq, the U.S. fenced its forces and officials into secure areas, which actually 
does not help the cause. To win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population the U.S. officials should 
learn to leave the field and join to the public.  
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To examine the impact of the components of winning hearts and minds, two sets of 
case studies
50
 are assessed in this thesis. The first set of case studies, which are Ma-
layan Emergency and Vietnam War, demonstrates the impact of the concept in the 
struggle against insurgencies. In this set, intervening states‟ policies on the popula-
tion of the intervened state are examined. The important conclusions of this set of 
case studies with regard to the use of components are as follows: 
(1)  In Malayan Emergency, the attempt of the British government to win the 
hearts and minds of the Malayan population was effective. The components 
of winning hearts and minds are implemented throughout the Emergency. 
The most prominent examples are the improvement of the intelligence servic-
es by encouraging the villagers to reveal information about the insurgents, 
dropping leaflets (propaganda), and the strategy of minimum use of force. 
(2) In the Vietnam War, the U.S. did not implement the components of winning 
hearts and minds effectively. On the contrary, the U.S. policy relied on air 
power, which hampered the idea of minimum use of force during response. 
Besides, the U.S. attempted to use the same components as Britain used in 
Malayan Emergency to win the hearts and minds of Vietnamese. However, it 
did not lead to success.     
To conclude, when the components of winning hearts and minds are implemented, 
the success of a state to cope with insurgency would be high. Moreover, same com-
ponents would not work in different cases. In the struggle against terror-
                                                 
50
 In this study the war in Iraq and Afghanistan are not examined as case studies, since the specified 
wars still continue. Therefore, it would not be totally effective to discuss those wars.  
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ism/insurgency, every case is unique and every case needs different policy prescrip-
tions.  
The second set of case studies, which are Madrid Attacks and London Bombings, 
reveals the impact of the concept in the struggle against terrorism. These cases are 
examined in the thesis in order to find out the implementation of the components 
through domestic policy actions on the Muslim population of Britain and Spain. In 
this set, there is neither intervening nor intervened state. But the domestic policies of 
Spanish and British government after the attacks, in order to win the hearts and 
minds of their Muslim citizens, are evaluated. The important conclusions of this set 
of case studies with regard to the use of components are as follows: 
(1) After London Bombings, the British government created new intelligence 
units to prevent further attacks. These units were successful to prevent an at-
tempt of explosions on March 21, 2005. To win the hearts and minds of Mus-
lim citizens, British government chose the component of public diplomacy. 
The Blair government used public diplomacy by gathering Muslim scholars 
and publicizing the Islamic values in order to make the British society to un-
derstand Islam. Furthermore, strategic communication is used via internet to 
familiarize the British society with Islam with the aim of preventing hostili-
ties inside the country. The general policy that the British government con-
ducted after London Bombings was community policing.  
(2) After Madrid Bombings, the Spanish government did not attempt to change 
its domestic policy towards its Muslim citizens as Britain did. By the election 
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of Zapatero, many changes occurred in Spain, but at the foreign policy level. 
In this regard, The Alliance of Civilizations is the most prominent initiative 
of the government. However, the government did not consider winning hearts 
and minds of its own Muslim citizens. In accordance to this, many Muslim 
citizens were arrested as a suspect of terrorist after the attacks. Therefore, the 
components of winning hearts and minds cannot be observed in the Spanish 
case.                 
To conclude, the implementation of the concept in domestic policy is achieved by 
applying community policing in the British case. However, Spanish government does 
not comprehend the same method. Therefore, the Spanish government needs to rely 
more on domestic policy rather than foreign policy per se. In the struggle against 
terrorism, the major method should be winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim 
population. This will prevent terrorism to flourish. As a result, the recruitment strate-
gy of terrorist organizations can also be prevented.  
This thesis gives the following recommendations on the concept of winning hearts 
and minds for further research: 
(1) There is a need to examine the concept through a variety of terrorism and in-
surgency based case studies. In this regard, the proposed components may as-
sist the researchers. 
(2) The cases with regard to intervened country‟s population are needed. In this 
regard, Iraq and Afghanistan Wars can be two proper case studies to analyze.  
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(3) Strategic Communication, one of the proposed components, is a new term 
that attempts to take the place of the concept of winning hearts and minds. It 
prioritizes communication theory to win asymmetrical conflicts. Scholars 
should be cognizant of the emergence of this term.  
Besides, 
(4) The decision-makers should consider the basic necessities in the practices of 
the concept of winning hearts and minds by taking the culture, language and 
societal norms of the intervened population into consideration.  
 113 
 
 
 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Avilés, Juan. 2004. “The Madrid Massacre: The Iraq Connection,” Real Instituto  
Elcano, 65: 1-5. 
Aznar, Jose M. March 24, 2004. “The Truth About 3/11,” The Wall Street Journal, 
At War. 
Barghoorn, Frederick C. January 1958. “Soviet Cultural Diplomacy Since Stalin,” 
Russian Review 17(1): 41-55. 
Barnes, Trevor. June 1981. “The Secret Cold War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign 
Policy in Europe, 1946-1956. Part I,” The Historical Journal 24(2): 399-415. 
BBC News. 2005. “London bomber video aired on TV,” BBC London Attacks. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206708.stm (accessed on May 10, 2009). 
 
BBC News. 2004. “Spain Threatens Iraq Troop Pull Out.” BBC website. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3512144.stm (accessed on May 1, 2009) 
 
BBC News Special Reports. 2005. “7 July Bombings,” BBC website, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/investigation/html/trail.st
m (accessed on May 10, 2009). 
Becker, Howard. April 1949. “The Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda,” 
American Sociological Review 14(2): 221-235. 
Beichman, Arnold. 1984. “The Story of Radio Free Europe,” National Review. 
Bell, Martin. October 30, 2008. "Asia-Pacific," BBC News.  
Bergen, Peter and Swati Pandey. February 29, 2006. “The Madrassa Scapegoat,” The 
Washington Quarterly. 117-125. 
 114 
 
Binno, Elaine, and Jean Valentine. April 1973. "Book Review: Winning Hearts and 
Minds: War Poems by Vietnam Veterans by Larry Rottmann; Jan Barry; Basil 
T. Paquet." College English 34(7): 1022-1026. 
Bjelajac, Slavko N. May 1962. “Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Ap-
proaches,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 
341: 74-81. 
Blakeley, Georgina. 2006. “It‟s Politics Stupid: The Spanish General Elections of 
2004,” Parliamentary Affairs 59(2): 331-349. 
 
Bland, S. A., DJ. Lockey, G. Davies, and A. D. Kehoe. 2006. “Military Perspective 
on the Civilian Response to the London Bombings July 2005,” JR Army Med 
Corps 152: 13-16. 
 
Bleich, Eric. 2009. “State Responses to „Muslim‟ Violence: A Comparison of Six 
West European Countries,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 361-379. 
Bolsever, George H. April 1948. “Soviet Ideology and Propaganda,” International 
Affairs. 170-180. 
Bonner, John. (trans.) 1856. Alexis de Tocqueville: the Old Regime and the Revolu-
tion. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers. 
Broderick, John Joyce. 1924. “Diplomacy,” The Catholic Historical Review. 68-84. 
Brookhiser, Richard. March 17, 1978. “Stilling the Heady Voices of Freedom,” Na-
tional Review. 332-363. 
Burks, Arthur W. July 1951. “Review: The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
by Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver,” The Philosophical Review, 398-
400. 
Bush, George. September 16, 2001 "The White House." The White House Web Site. 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-
2.html (accessed in April 1, 2010). 
Bytwerk, Randall. 2001. “Propaganda,” Calvin College Website  
-----. 2007. “German Propaganda Archieve,” Calvin College. 
http://bytwerk.com/gpa/signal.htm (accessed on July 02, 2010). 
Cable, Larry. Autumn 1993. “Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-
Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 
4(2): 228-262. 
 115 
 
Cassidy, Robert M. Summer 2004. "Back to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsur-
gency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars," Parameters US Army 
War College Quarterly: 73-83. 
 
Center for Reformed Theology and Apolegetics. “Notes on Phillippians,: From the 
Original 1599 Geneva Bible Notes.” 
http://www.reformed.org/documents/index.html?mainframe=http://www.refor
med.org/documents/geneva/philippians.html (accessed on June 06, 2010). 
Center on Diplomacy Research Group. 2010. About the Center on Public Diplomacy. 
California: USC Center on Public Diplomacy. 
Changing Minds. “Cognitive Dissonance,” 
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/cognitive_dissonance.htm (ac-
cessed on May 5, 2009). 
Cognitive Dissonance. “General Experience Psychology Cognitive Dissonance Lab,” 
http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/stephens/cdback.html. 
Corman, Steven R. 2010 “The Role of Narrative in Strategic Communication." Paper 
presented at the Symposium on “Global Terrorism and International Coopera-
tion,” held by Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT), 
Ankara, Turkey. March 15,16. 
-----, Angela Tretheway and Bud Goodall. April 2007. “A 21st Century Model for 
Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to 
Pragmatic Complexity,” Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona 
State University. 1-18. 
Coste, Brutus. 1950-1951. “Propaganda to East Europe,” The Public Opinion Quar-
terly. Winter. 14(4): 639-666. 
Country Team Stuff Commitee. January 4, 1961. Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for 
Vietnam. Washington D.C.: Department of State. 
Cowie, A. P. (ed.) 1989. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i_1961/a.html (accessed on June 
01, 2009) 
Cull, Nicholas J. 2008a. “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, 31-54. 
 116 
 
-----. April 16, 2008b. “'Public Diplomacy' Before Gullion: The Evaluation of a 
Phrase,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy. 
Cummings, Richard H. 2008 “The Ether War: Hostile Intelligence Activities Di-
rected Against Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Emigre Community 
in Munich during the Cold War,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 6(2): 168-
182. 
-----. April 28, 2010. “The Winds of Freedom and Crusade for Freedom,” History 
Times. 20
th
 century History: Cold War.  
Çevik, Abdülkadir. July / September 2009. “The Role of Perception Management in 
Terrorism,” Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism Newsletter. 2(12): 
42-43. 
Darley, William M. December 2008. "Distilling Strategic Communication." The US 
Army Professional Writing Collection 6. 
Davison, Phillips W. November 1971. “Some Trends in International Propaganda,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 398: 1-13. 
Deery, Phillip. 2001. “Covert Propaganda and the Cold War,” The Round Table 361: 
607-621. 
Department of Defense. 1971a. The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963. (Vol. 2) 
Chapter 2 in The Pentagon Papers. Boston: Beacon Press: 128-159. 
Department of Defense. 1971b. U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 
1950-1954. (Vol. 1) Chapter 2 in Pentagon Papers, Boston: Beacon Press. 53-
107. 
Department of Defense. 2007. Implementation of the DOD Strategic Communication 
Plan for Afghanistan. Washington DC. 
Department of the Army Headquarters. June 2006. Field Manual 3-24: Counterin-
surgency. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army. 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. September 25, 2006. Strategic Communication (SC) 
Execution Roadmap. Washington D.C.: Quadrennial Defense Review. 
Deutsch, Robert D. September / October 2007. "The Droning of Strategic Communi-
cation and Public Diplomacy," Military Review. 124-126. 
 117 
 
Dilworth, R. L. August 29, 1986. Counterinsurgency Operations. Field Manual 
No:90-8. Department of the Army, Wahington D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps. (x2 
US marine corps die var,ayrıca text te yok). 
Dodds, E.R. 2004. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Drago, Tito. “SPAIN: Who Was Behind the Madrid Bombings? Uncertainty 
Reigns,” Inter Press Service 
http://www.ipsnews.net/ (accessed on May 5, 2009) 
Eayrs, James. 1951-1952. “New Weapons in the Cold War: A Study of Recent Tech-
niques in International Propaganda,” International Journal: 36-47. 
Eder, Mari K. July / August 2007. "Toward Strategic Communication," Military Re-
view. 61-70. 
Elworthy, Scilla. July 20, 2005. “Open Democracy,” 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/solution_2690.jsp (accessed 
on March 6, 2009). 
Freedland, Jonathan. July 7, 2006. “How London Carried On,” The Guardian. 7 July 
London Attacks. 
Finn, Helena K. 2003 “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Au-
diences,” Foreign Affairs. November-December. 82(6): 15-20. 
Fishel, Max G. and John T. Manwaring. 1992. “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: 
Toward a New Analytical Approach,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 3(3): 272-
310. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (FWA) Research Paper. 2005. “Counter-
Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries,” Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs. 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/4175218/counter-terrorism-Oct05 (accessed 
on May 10, 2009) 
 
Fox, Robin Lane. 2006 The Classical World: An Epic History from Homer to Ha-
drian. New York: Basic Books. 
Förster, Jürgen. 2003. “Ludendorff and Hitler in Perspective: The Battle for the 
German Soldier's Mind: 1917-1944,” War in History 10(3): 321-334. 
Galula, David. 2006. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Praeger Se-
curity International.  
 118 
 
Ganor, Boaz. 2005. The Counter Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. 
New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. 
Gardiner, Nile.  July 7, 2006. “The London Bombings One Year Later,” The Herit-
age Foundation, 1145: 1-3. 
Giles, Lionel (ed.). 1910. Sun-Tzu: Art of War. London: Luzac and Co. 
Goebbels, Joseph. 1934. "Propaganda," Phil Taylor's Web site. 
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=715&paper=2159 
(accessed on June 06, 2010). 
Goltz, Colmar Freiherr von der. 1883/1994. “The Nation in Arms.” In Gérard Cha-
liand, ed., The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear 
Age. University of California Press. 
Goodwin, Robin, Michelle Willson, and Stanley Jr. Gaines. 2005. "Terror Threat 
Perception and its Concequences in Contemporary Britain," British Journal of 
Psychology 96, 389-406. 
Gourevitch, Victor (ed. and trans.) 1997. Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other 
Later Writings. Cambridge: UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Granville, Johanna. 2005. “„Caught with Jam on Our Fingers‟: Radio Free Europe 
and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,” Diplomatic History 29(5): 811-839. 
Gregorian, Raffi. Winter 1994. "'Jungle Bashing' in Malaya: Towards a Formal Tac-
tical Doctrine," Small Wars and Insurgencies 5(3): 338-359. 
Gregory, Frank. 2005. “Intelligence led Counter Terrorism: A Brief Analysis of the 
UK Domestic Intelligence Systems‟s Response to 9/11  and the Implications of 
the London Bombings of 7 July 2005,” Real Instituto Elcano. 
 
Global Security. “3-11 Madrid Train Bombers,” Homeland Security.  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/3-
11_madrid_train_bombers.htm (accessed on May 1, 2009) 
 
Global Security. March 16, 2004. “Spanish Election: Is „Punishment Vote‟ for Aznar 
a Win For Terrorists?” Homeland Security. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2004/03/wwwh40317.htm 
(accessed on May 5, 2009) 
Hack, Karl. 1999a. “Corpses, Prisoners of War and Captured Documents: British and 
Communist Narratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of Intel-
ligence Transformation,” Intelligence and National Security 14(4): 211-241. 
 119 
 
-----. 1999b. “Iron Claws on Malaya: The Histriography of the Malayan Emergency,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30(1): 99-125. 
Hamilton, Donald W. 1998. The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the 
Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia. Westport: Praeger. 
Handel, Michael I. 1989. War, Strategy and Intelligence. London: Frank Cass and 
Company Limited. 
Hartman, Thom. 2008. Cracking the Code: How to Win Hearts, Change Minds, and 
Restore America's Original Vision. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Herr, Richard. 1962. Tocqueville and the Old Regime. Princeton, New Jersey: Prin-
ceton University Press. 
Howard, Michael and Peter Paret (ed. and trans.) 1993. Carl von Clausewitz: On 
War. London: Everyman's Library. 
Hibbert, Adam. 2006. The Power of the Media. London: Franklin Watts. 
Hickey, Jennifer G. November 12, 2001. "Winning Hearts and Minds: the Bush Ad-
ministration has Launched a War of Words in Addition to its Military Strikes 
in an Attempt to Sway the People of the Middile East to the Side of the United 
States," Insight on the News, 1-3. 
Hixson, Walter L. 1997. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold 
War. New York: St Martin's Press. 
Hoffman, Steven Ludwig. June 2003. “Democracy and Associations in the Long 
Nineteenth Century: Toward a Transnational Perspective,” The Journal of 
Modern History 75, 269-299. 
Home Office. 2008. “Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery,” 
Home Office.  
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publicationsearch/prevent-
strategy/preventing-violent-extremism?view=Binary (accessed on May 10, 
2009). 
Horwitz, Morton J. July 1966. “Tocqueville and the Tyranny of the Majority,” The 
Review of Politics 28(3): 293-307. 
Inkeles, Alex. October 1953. "The Soviet Attack on the Voice of America: A Case 
Study in Propaganda Warfare," American Slavic and East European Review 
12(3): 319-342. 
 120 
 
Innes, Martin. 2006. “Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community 
Intelligence and Democratic Policing,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 605: 222-241. 
 
Jacobson, Michael. 2010. “Terrorist Financing and Internet,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 33, 353-363. 
Janowitz, Morris. Winter 1961. “Mass Persuasion and International Relations,” The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 25(4): 560-570. 
Johnson, Wray R. 1998. “War, Culture and the Interpretation of History: The Viet-
nam War Reconsidered,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 9(2): 83-113. 
Joint Resolution of Congress. August 7, 1964. The Avalon Project. Yale Law School: 
Lillian Goldman Law Library. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/tonkin-
g.asp (accessed on June 8, 2010). 
Jones, Tim. Winter 1996. “The British Army, and Counter-Guerilla Warfare in Tran-
sition, 1944-1952,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 7(3): 265-307. 
Jordan, Javier and Nicola Horsburgh. 2005. “Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, 169-191. 
Jowett, Garth. 2009. “Review: The Cold War and the United States Information 
Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy: 1945-1989,” Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio and Television 29(1): 129-132. 
----- and Victoria O'Donnell. 2005. Propaganda and Persuasion. Sage. 
Kahn, David. 2006. “The Rise of Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 85(5): 125-134. 
Karmani, Sohail. 2006. “Good Muslims Speak English,” Critical Discourse Studies 
3(1): 103-105. 
Kilcullen, David. 2004. “Countering Global Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf (accessed on January 05, 
2010). 
Klausen, Jytte. 2009. “British Counter-Terrorism after 7/7: Adapting Community 
Policing to the Fight against Domestic Terrorism,” Journal of Ethnic and Mi-
gration Studies 35(3): 403-420. 
Kroenig, Matthew, Melissa McAdam and Steven Weber. February 23, 2009. Taking 
Soft Power Seriously. Draft.  
Krol, Marcin. 2001. “Listening Through the Jamming,” The American Scholar, 431-
435. 
 121 
 
Laswell, Harol D. 1951. “The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda,” Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science 24(2): 66-78. 
Lee, Richard C. K. 2009. “The Pascalian Heart and the Kierkegaardian Passion: on 
Faith and Subjectivity,” Evangelical Quarterly, 338-355. 
Lilja, Jannie. 2009. "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel 
Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka," Terrorism and Public 
Violence 21(2): 306-326. 
London Assembly Reports. 2006. Report of the 7 July Review Committee. London. 
http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/7july/report.pdf (accessed on May 
10, 2009). 
Lucas, Scott. May 1996. “Campaigns of Truth: The Psychological Strategy Board 
and American Ideology, 1951-1953,” The International History Review 18(2): 
279-302. 
Ludendorff, Erich. 1920. The General Staff and its Problems Vol. II. London: Hut-
chinson. 
Lutz, Ralph Haswell. December 1933. “Studies of World War Propaganda, 1914-
33,” The Journal of Modern History 5(4): 496-516. 
Mahnken, Thomas G. June 2007. “The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: An 
American View,” Defense & Security Analysis 23(2): 227-232. 
Maoist Documentation Project. 2000. Mao Tse-tung: On Guerilla Warfare.  
Martin, Nina. June 20, 1987. “VOA-Europe: Message Radio," The Nation, 848-852. 
Martinez, Edda, ve Edward A. Suchman. Spring 1950. “Letters from America and 
the 1948 Elections in Italy,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 14(1): 111-125. 
McCormick, Gordon H. 2003. "Terrorist Decision Making," Annual Review of Polit-
ical Science 6, 473-507. 
Medhurst, Martin J. Fall 1997. “Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom: The Rhe-
torical Origins of a Cold War Campaign,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 
27(4): 646-661. 
Mickelson, Sig. 1978. “Filling the Information Gap.” Delivered to the Cincinnati 
Rotary Club. Ohio, May 25. 
Mill, John Stuart. 1864. Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical and 
Historical Vol II. Boston: William V. Spencer. 
 122 
 
Mockaitis, Thomas R. 1990a/b. British Counterinsurgency 1919-60. London: The 
Macmillan Press LTD. 
-----. December 1990. “The Origins of British Counter-Insurgency,” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 1(3): 209-226. 
Modood, Tariq. June 20, 2007. “Multiculturalism's Civic Future: A Response,” Open 
Democracy.  
Moreno, Luis. October 15, 2005. “The Madrid Bombings in the Domestic and Re-
gional Politics of Spain,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, 65-72. 
 
Murray, John. April 6, 2005. “Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing 
or Just a Shift in Priorities?” Police Practice and Research, 347-361. 
Murphy, Dennis M. January 2008. "The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s)." 
Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College 2(8): 1-4. 
Murphy, Paul. 2006. Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005. Intel-
ligence and Security Committee: The Stationery Office. 
Nagl, John A. 2005. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons 
from Malaya to Vietnam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Nastasi, Mike. 2001. “The Role of Air Power in the Vietnam War,” Military History 
Online. http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/vietnam/airpower/ (accessed on 
June 08, 2010). 
Nixon, Richard. 1985. No More Vietnams. New York: Avon Books. 
Nye, Jospeh S. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science 616, 94-109. 
Office for Security and Counter Terrorism. 2006. “Legislation: Terrorism Act 2006,” 
Home Office.  
 
Office of Public Sector Information. 2005. “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005: Ex-
planatory Notes,” Home Office: Part of the National Archives. 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/en/ukpgaen_20050002_en.pdf (accessed on 
May 12, 2009). 
 
Oliver, Mark and Sarah Left. December 16, 2004. Law Lords Back Terror Detainees. 
The Guardian.  
 
O‟Neill, Sean, Tim Reid and Michael Evans. April 28, 2007.  “7/7 „Mastermind‟ is 
seized in Iraq,” The Sunday Times, World News. 
 123 
 
Osgood, Kenneth A. 2002. “Review Essay: Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional 
Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4(2): 85-107. 
Parry-Gilles, Shawn J. Spring 1994. “The Eisenhower Administration's Conceptuali-
zation of the USIA: The Development of Overt and Covert Propaganda Strate-
gies,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 24(2): 263-276. 
Payne, Kenneth. 2009. "Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology and Ter-
ror," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, 109-128. 
Paz, Reuven. 2004a. “A Message to the Spanish People: The Neglected Threat by 
Qa`idat al-Jihad,” PRISM Series of Special Dispatches on Global Jihad, 2(2): 
1-8. 
 
-----. 2004b. “Qa`idat al-Jihad, Iraq, and Madrid: The First Tile in the Domino Ef-
fect?” Prism Series of Special Dispatches on Global Jihad, 2(1): 1-5. 
Postill, John. September 12-13, 2003. “The Development of Sustainable Propagan-
da,” Cabaran Pembangunan, Dilema Persekitaran. Bangi, Malaysia: Anjuran 
Pusat Sosial, Pembangunan dan Persekitaran, 1-13. 
Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social In-
quiry. John Wiley & Sons Inc:  New York. 
Puddington, Arch. 2000. Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky. 
Ramakrishna, Kumar. February 2001. “„Transmogrifying‟ Malaya: The impact of Sir 
General Templer (1952-54),” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 32(1): 79-92. 
Ranstorp, Magnus. 2005. “The London Bombings and the Border Strategic Context,” 
Real Instituto Elcano 100, 1-5. 
 
Rasmussen, Maria. September 5, 2005. “Some Thoughts on the London Bombings,” 
Strategic Insights. 
Rearden, Steven L. 2001. "Feature Review: „The Cold War: How the Winner Won,‟" 
Diplomatic History 25(4): 707-712. 
Reeve, Henry. (trans.) 2003. Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America Volume 
One and Two. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 
Reinares, Fernando. 2008. “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms 
and the Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” Real Instituto Elcano, 
Working Paper, 1-19. 
 124 
 
Robin, Ron. 2001. The Making of the Cold War Enemy : Culture and Politics in the 
Military Intellectual Complex. NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rose, William, Rysia Murphy and Max Abrahms. 2007. “Correspondence,” Interna-
tional Security 32(1): 185-192. 
Rokeach, Milton. 2001. "Attitude Change and Behavioral Change." Attitude Organi-
zation and Modification. National Science Foundation, 529-550. 
Ronczkowski, Michael R. 2004 “Gathering Information, the Key to the Process” and 
“Understanding and Defining Terrorism” In Michael R. Ronczkowski, ed., 
Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and 
Investigations, 71-87; 16-52. Washington D.C.: CRC Press, 2004. 
Rouse, Ed. “Psychological Operations/Warfare.” 
http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html (accessed on December 2008). 
Saggar, Shamit. 2009. “Boomerangs and Slingshots: Radical Islamism and Counter-
Terrorism Strategy,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 381-402. 
Schmid, Alex P. Summer 2004. "Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism," Ter-
rorism and Political Violence 16(2): 197-221. 
Sélincourt, Aubrey de (trans.) 1971. Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Shaw, Tony. 2006. “The BBC, the State and Cold War Culture: The Case of Televi-
sion's,” English Historical Review 121(494): 1351-1384. 
Shelley, Percy Bysshe. 1852. Essays, Letters from Abroad: Translations and Frag-
ments Volume I. Mary Shelley, ed., London: Edward Moxon. 
Shortsleeve, Patrick M. April 2005. Alexander The Great's Lessons For Warfighting 
in Southwest Asia. Alabama: Air University: Air Command and Staff College. 
Simpsons, Jay Gordon. Summer 1999. "Not by Bombs Alone: Lessons from Ma-
laya," Joint Force Quarterly, 91-98. 
Smith, Simon. 2001. “General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts 
and Minds, Intelligence, and Propaganda,” Intelligence and National Security 
16(3): 60-78. 
Smitha, Frank Eugene. 1998. "Alexander the Great: Macedon and Philip II," Macro 
History World Report Web site. http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/ch11.htm (ac-
cessed on June 20, 2009). 
 125 
 
Speier, Hans. Spring 1948. “The Future of Psychological Warfare,” The Public Opi-
nion Quarterly 12(1): 5-18. 
Stavridis, James G. 2007. "Strategic Communication and National Security," Joint 
Forces Quarterly 46, 4-7. 
Sunderland, Riley. September 1964. “Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960,” 
Rand Cooperation, 1-267. 
The Board For International Broadcasting. 1990. Annual Report on Radio Free Eu-
rope/Radio Liberty, Inc. Washington DC. 
The Economist. July 9, 2005. “London Under Attack,” 376(8434): 9. 
The True Story of Alexander the Great. 2004. Jim Lindsay, director, History Chan-
nel. 
Thieux, Laurence. 2004. “European Security and Global Terrorism: the Strategic 
Aftermath of the Madrid Bombings,” Perspectives 22, 59-74. 
Truman, Harry S. October 19, 1948. "Address at the State Capitol, Raleigh, North 
Carolina," The American Presidency Project. 
http://presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13056 (accessed May 05, 2010). 
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. September 1995. Global Commu-
nications: Oportunities for Trade and Aid. Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office. 
-----, Senate, Commitee on Foreign Relations, 1st Session. July 1967. United States 
Recognition of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia: Statement by the Department of 
State, February 7, 1950. Governmental Document, Department of State, Wash-
ington D.C.: Government Printing Office.  
Urban, G.R. June 1990. “Radio Freeing Europe,” National Review, 40-43. 
Woodworth, Paddy. 2004. “The War against Terrorism: the Spanish Experience from 
ETA to Al-Qaeda.” International Journal of Iberian Studies 17(3): 169-182. 
William, Darley M. December 2008. “Distilling Strategic Communication,” The US 
Army Professional Writing Collection 6. 
Wolf, Charles Jr. July 1965. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and 
Old Realities," The Rand Cooperation, 1-25. 
  
